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THE ONE PERCENT PROBLEM
Kevin M. Stack*
Michael P. Vandenbergh**
Parties frequently seek exemption from regulation on the ground that
they contribute only a very small share to a problem. These “one percent argu-
ments” are not inherently questionable; it can be efficient to exclude relatively
small contributors. These arguments also garner broad acceptance in part
because they exploit cognitive biases that induce individuals to discount or
ignore small values. But, when a regulatory problem can be solved only by
regulating small contributors, accepting one percent arguments creates what
we call the one percent problem. This Article shows that this general problem
for regulation has particularly damaging effects on climate change policy:
The global character of the climate change problem allows many sources of
carbon emissions to make one percent arguments, but the climate problem
cannot be solved without attending to these sources. This Article then isolates
a gap in U.S. climate policy that is a critical barrier to addressing the one
percent problem for climate change. Specifically, Congress currently legislates
and appropriates without calculating the emissions consequences of its ac-
tions or adhering to an emissions budget. Both are necessary. Congress has
long responded to one percent problems in managing the federal deficit by
requiring cost disclosures and budget offsetting. Requiring Congress to dis-
close the carbon emissions arising from legislation will treat carbon costs on
par with financial costs, and bring Congress’s emissions disclosure duties in
line with those that already apply to federal agencies and many industrial
sources. Adopting a budgeting precommitment strategy of last resort—a car-
bon pay-as-you-go rule—will directly confront the analytic slippage exploited
by one percent arguments.
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INTRODUCTION
Parties commonly justify exemption from regulation by claiming to
be only one percent of a problem. Companies make this argument when
seeking to avoid liability for disposal site cleanup costs.1 Consumer advo-
cates make it when seeking to deflect requirements to improve household
energy efficiency.2 Industrial sectors make it when seeking to avoid sec-
1. See, e.g., United States v. Kramer, 757 F. Supp. 397, 423 (D.N.J. 1991) (striking “de
minimis” defense to Superfund claim).
2. See, e.g., Consumer Protection Provisions in Climate Legislation: Hearing Before
Subcomm. on Energy & Env’t of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 111th Cong. 87
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tor-wide economic, worker safety, health, and environmental regula-
tions.3 Federal agencies make this argument to avoid detailed analysis of
the potential for environmental disasters, such as the recent BP Gulf of
Mexico well blowout.4 Nations make it when seeking to avoid interna-
tional fishing restrictions5 and carbon emissions targets.6 We call the
claim that a relatively small contributor should be exempt from regula-
tion a “one percent argument.”7
One percent arguments are not inherently questionable. Where rela-
tively large sources contribute to a problem, efficiency considerations
often justify excluding small contributors from regulatory requirements.
At a basic economic level, if the marginal cost of regulatory compliance
by relatively small, one percent contributors exceeds the marginal bene-
fits, exempting one percent contributors may be advisable.8 Not surpris-
ingly, many statutes and regulations include exemptions for small actions
or entities;9 the common law de minimis doctrine also provides a rule of
reason that prevents liability based on trifles.10
(Mar. 12, 2009), available at http://www.umc-gbcs.org/ (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) (statement of John S. Hill, Director for Environmental Justice, United Methodist
Church) (“Those least responsible . . . are most vulnerable to its effects. Let us not
perpetuate further this injustice by forcing those same individuals to shoulder additional
and disproportionate costs of proposed solutions.”).
3. See, e.g., Letter from James C. May, President and CEO, Air Transp. Ass’n of Am.,
to Todd Stern, Special Envoy for Climate Change, U.S. Dep’t of State (Oct. 29, 2009),
available at http://airlines.org/PublicPolicy/ATALetters/Pages/letters_10-29-09.aspx (on
file with the Columbia Law Review) (noting “U.S. airlines account for less than 2 percent of
the U.S. GHG inventory”).
4. See, e.g., 1 Minerals Mgmt. Serv., U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Gulf of Mexico OCS
Oil and Gas Lease Sales: 2007–2012, at xiii (2006), available at http://www.gomr.boemre.
gov/PDFs/2006/2006-062-Vol1.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (“The effect of
proposed-action-related oil spills . . . is expected to cause less than a 1 percent decrease
in . . . standing stocks of any population, commercial fishing efforts, landings, or value of
those landings.”).
5. See, e.g., Final Rule on International Fisheries Regulations, 74 Fed. Reg. 65,460,
65,463 (Dec. 10, 2009) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pts. 300, 665) (“Multilateral action is
essential to ensure that overfishing of bigeye tuna in the Pacific Ocean ends, although U.S.
fisheries comprise a very small portion of Pacific-wide bigeye tuna harvests (less than 3
percent in 2004).”).
6. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 544 (2007) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting)
(concluding “petitioners’ desired emission standards might reduce only a fraction of 4
percent of global emissions”).
7. We use the term one percent as a shorthand for relatively small shares including
those slightly above and far below one percent. See infra Part I.A.
8. See infra Part I.A (describing exemptions from regulatory compliance for those
whose contributions to regulated issue appear to be relatively insignificant).
9. See infra text accompanying notes 30–46 (noting specific exemptions). R
10. The maxim de minimis non curat lex, “[t]he law does not concern itself with
trifles,” Black’s Law Dictionary 496 (9th ed. 2009), applies at common law to deny liability
for very small injuries. See, e.g., F.A.D. Andrea, Inc. v. Dodge, 15 F.2d 1003, 1005 (3d Cir.
1926) (“It is the growing policy of the law not to take notice of trifling matters. ‘De minimis
non curat lex’ is a maxim which has greater force to-day than ever.”); Fullam v. Stearns, 30
Vt. 443, 455 (1857) (“The maxim ‘de minimis non curat lex,’ I apprehend, whenever it is
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The one percent problem results, however, when the acceptance of
one percent arguments impedes or increases the cost of achieving socially
desirable outcomes. Our concern is with the strong form of the one per-
cent problem: when the one percent argument is made in circumstances
where small contributors account for so much of a regulatory problem
that the social goal cannot be met without regulating many one percent
sources.11 It is one thing to exempt relatively small contributors when
large contributors account for the vast majority of the problem; it is quite
another when the social goal cannot be achieved without regulating small
contributors. One percent arguments can be particularly difficult to solve
in part because of their intuitive appeal. As research on the behavioral
effects of information framing suggests, in some situations individuals
have a tendency to treat very small percentages and probabilities as if they
were zero.12 When all or many of the contributors are relatively small
ones, however, the aggregation of one percent arguments leaves the
problem without a solution.
The one percent problem is a general one affecting many areas of
regulation, but it has particularly acute effects with regard to the largest-
scale environmental problem of our day: the potential for catastrophic
climate change. The structure of the climate challenge invites one per-
cent arguments and makes its one percent problem particularly perni-
cious. One percent arguments necessarily depend upon framing a de-
nominator or relative group for comparison; the broader the problem’s
framing—the air quality in a city, a region, or the global atmosphere—
the more sources or contributors become candidates for one percent ar-
guments. With regard to climate change, it is natural to frame the prob-
lem in global terms; it is a global problem. But once it is framed that way,
the size of the denominator—all activities that produce greenhouse gases
(GHGs), viewed globally—is staggering, and this framing makes almost
any source of emissions, including entire industrial sectors within a given
country, or even entire countries, candidates for one percent arguments.
Framing the climate problem at a global level makes it difficult to see
the importance of including any particular emissions source in the regu-
applied correctly to take away a right of recovery, has reference to the injury, and not to
the resulting damage.”). The Supreme Court has embraced de minimis as a default rule of
construction, applicable to statutory claims absent a clear statement to the contrary: “[T]he
venerable maxim de minimis non curat lex . . . is part of the established background of legal
principles against which all enactments are adopted, and which all enactments (absent
contrary indication) are deemed to accept.” Wis. Dep’t of Revenue v. William Wrigley, Jr.,
Co., 505 U.S. 214, 231 (1992). We discuss how de minimis risk thresholds differ from the
one percent problem below. See infra note 47. R
11. We describe the weaker form of the one percent problem in Part I.A, and
distinguish it from the stronger form, which is our central concern.
12. See infra Part I.B (discussing behavioral anomalies regarding perception of small
numbers and probabilities).
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latory program. With regard to a source of carbon emissions13 such as the
U.S. lead industry, which amounts to roughly .00001 of global emis-
sions,14 or .0001 of national emissions,15 urgency (and willingness to act
to reduce emissions) is lost by orders of magnitude. In the most extreme
example, if an individual reduces emissions by one ton of carbon dioxide,
the reduction will only account for a .0000000000015 (eleven zeros) °C
reduction in temperature.16 Yet the risk of catastrophic climate change
may be impossible to reduce unless billions of these individuals change
their behavior.17
The ability to treat almost any carbon source as a one percent source
facilitates a one percent problem because the climate challenge cannot
be solved without requiring reductions from sources that can frame their
contributions in one percent terms. To avoid possible climate tipping
points, after which catastrophic climate change may occur and human
efforts to mitigate climate change will be futile,18 climate scientists and
13. We use the term “carbon” not to refer to the specific element carbon but to refer
generally to all six of the greenhouse gases subject to targets in the Kyoto Protocol (carbon
dioxide (CO2); methane (CH4); nitrous oxide (N2O); hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs);
perfluorocarbons (PFCs); and sulphur hexafluoride (SF6)). These six greenhouse gases are
often expressed in carbon dioxide equivalents (CO2-e). Piers Forster et al.,
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Changes in Atmospheric Constituents and
in Radiative Forcing, in Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis 131, 137–43
(Susan Solomon et al. eds., 2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_
and_data/ar4/wg1/en/contents.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
14. See Envtl. Prot. Agency, EPA 430-R-10-006, Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas
Emissions and Sinks: 1990–2008, at ES-5 tbls.ES-2 & ES-7 (2010) [hereinafter EPA,
Inventory], available at http://epa.gov/climatechange/emissions/usgginv_archive.html
(on file with the Columbia Law Review) (noting U.S. lead industry emissions for 2008 were
0.3 Tg CO2-e, which is .0000098759, or approximately .00001, of total global emissions at
30,337 Tg CO2-e).
15. See id. at ES-3, ES-5 tbl.ES-2 (noting U.S. lead industry emissions for 2008 were 0.3
Tg CO2-e, which is .00014, or approximately .0001, of total U.S. emissions at 6,956.8 Tg
CO2-e).
16. See H. Damon Matthews et al., The Proportionality of Global Warming to
Cumulative Carbon Emissions, 459 Nature 829, 829–30 (2009) (analyzing relationship
between carbon emissions and global warming). For a discussion of the implications of the
Matthews et al. study, see Carbon Emissions Linked to Global Warming in Simple Linear
Relationship, ScienceDaily (June 11, 2009), http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2009/
06/090610154453.htm (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (“These findings mean that
we can now say: if you emit that tonne of carbon dioxide, it will lead to 0.0000000000015
degrees of global temperature change.”).
17. See, e.g., Thomas Dietz, Gerald T. Gardner, Jonathan Gilligan, Paul C. Stern &
Michael P. Vandenbergh, Household Actions Can Provide a Behavioral Wedge to Rapidly
Reduce U.S. Carbon Emissions, 106 Proc. Nat’l Acad. Sci. U.S. 18,452, 18,452–53 (2009)
(demonstrating how behavioral wedge of carbon emissions reductions can be achieved by
U.S. households); Michael P. Vandenbergh & Anne C. Steinemann, The Carbon-Neutral
Individual, 82 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1673, 1709–28 (2007) [hereinafter Vandenbergh &
Steinemann, Carbon-Neutral] (proposing norms-based strategies for household emissions
reductions).
18. We discuss the possibility of avoiding climate tipping points, but we recognize that
it may not be possible to avoid crossing one or more tipping points at this late date. See
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policymakers have advocated emissions reductions that begin in the near
term and reduce global carbon emissions by 50 to 80% from 1990 levels
by 2050, with steep additional reductions thereafter.19 Yet, at the interna-
tional and domestic levels emissions, sources that can make the one per-
cent argument produce 20 to 40% of all emissions, making the emissions
reduction targets very expensive if not impossible to achieve without in-
cluding the one percent sources.20
This Article provides the first conceptualization of the one percent
problem and its impact on climate change law and policy, and defends a
regulatory regime to respond to it in the domestic sphere. A central
thrust of the Article is diagnostic: We identify a general regulatory obsta-
cle, and we illustrate why it is a particularly significant and cross-cutting
difficulty for climate change policy. Climate change policy is a classic ex-
ample of the challenge posed by one percent problems: The economic
intuitions invoked by one percent arguments, the behavioral tendency to
treat very small shares as zero, and the susceptibility of sources to be
framed in one percent terms, are a recipe for inaction. Part I provides a
general account of the one percent problem, and Part II illustrates why
the climate change problem cannot be solved without regulating one per-
cent sources. Beyond diagnosis, the Article defends a response tailored to
address the analytic slippage exploited by one percent arguments and a
gaping hole in current climate change policy. The one percent problem
for climate emerges from treating each case individually, irrespective of
the cumulative effects on the whole. To address climate change, however,
the nation must begin to reduce its cumulative emissions in the relatively
near term. Yet the body most responsible for setting that course—Con-
gress—legislates and appropriates without any requirement to estimate
the carbon emissions consequences of its actions, much less adhere to an
emissions budget. Both are necessary.
As we argue in Part III, the absence of a legislative disclosure require-
ment is striking. Federal agencies and a vast swath of the private sector
calculate the carbon emissions of their actions. Not so with Congress.
Without a carbon emissions disclosure rule, the emissions consequences
of federal legislation are not well understood and currently not even sub-
ject to debate when Congress considers new laws and appropriations.
This creates a risk not only of a lack of information, but also of misinfor-
mation: Specific provisions in legislation that will reduce carbon emis-
sions may be emphasized while the vastly more important carbon effects
of other aspects of the legislation go unnoticed, leaving a false impression
about the net effects of the legislation. As we show, the 2009 American
generally Jody Freeman & Andrew Guzman, Climate Change and U.S. Interests, 109
Colum. L. Rev. 1531 (2009) (discussing modeling of catastrophic climate change).
19. See infra Part II.A.1.
20. See infra Part II.B.
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Reinvestment and Recovery Act,21 known as the stimulus bill, is a case in
point.22 Moreover, Congress has imposed comparable analysis require-
ments on its legislative activity in other areas. Our carbon disclosure pro-
posal draws on the extensive congressional experience with calculating
and disclosing the fiscal cost of legislation (and the costs imposed on
nonfederal entities), as required under budgeting legislation and rules.23
A similar requirement to estimate the carbon emissions of bills and legis-
lation is not only feasible, but also would facilitate the type of cumulative
priority setting that financial cost estimates foster.
Once a legislative carbon disclosure regime is in place, the next,
more ambitious, and necessary step is to subject federal legislation and
appropriations to emissions budgeting. In Part IV, we defend a precom-
mitment strategy of last resort for fiscal budgeting: a Pay-As-You-Go
(PAYGO) rule similar to the PAYGO rules that have applied in recent
years to federal legislation and spending.24 Under this regime, the net
effects of legislation approved in any congressional term must fall within
an established emissions budget, just as the net effect of federal spending
must fall within particular deficit reduction goals under budgetary ver-
sions of PAYGO. The strong parallels between the political dynamics of
federal budgeting and those of the carbon problem recommend this turn
to the strong medicine of a PAYGO rule. The political costs of both defi-
cit and emissions reductions are near-term, specific to identifiable inter-
est groups, and easy to quantify, but the benefits of both are long-term,
diffuse, and difficult to quantify. Both are particularly vulnerable to one
percent arguments, since both federal expenditures and global emissions
provide a huge denominator, enabling advocates to argue that the ad-
verse impacts of their legislative measure will be insignificant.
The PAYGO strategy acknowledges that our ordinary political pro-
cess may not be up to the task of addressing the climate change problem
or finding the most efficient ways to achieve emissions reductions.25 In
21. Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115 (2009) (to be codified in scattered titles of
U.S.C.).
22. See infra text accompanying notes 161–167 (noting net effects of stimulus bill on R
carbon emissions).
23. See, e.g., 2 U.S.C. § 653(1) (2006) (requiring Congressional Budget Office
(CBO)’s estimate of bills’ cost to be included in committee reports when practicable); Id.
§ 658b(c) (requiring CBO estimates of cost of unfunded federal mandates to be included,
when practicable, in committee reports). See generally infra Part III.B.1 (providing
account of budgeting disclosure rules for legislatives process). For a discussion
characterizing congressional budget rules as “[t]he most influential and ubiquitous
procedural framework” for information disclosure in Congress, see Elizabeth Garrett &
Adrian Vermeule, Institutional Design of a Thayerian Congress, 50 Duke L.J. 1277, 1307
(2001).
24. The current PAYGO legislation is the Statutory Pay-As-You-Go Act of 2010, Pub. L.
No. 111-139, 124 Stat. 8 (to be codified in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C.) which we discuss
below. See generally infra Part IV.C.1 (providing account of pay-as-you-go budgeting).
25. For a discussion of the effects of offset requirements on fiscal issues, see Elizabeth
Garrett, Harnessing Politics: The Dynamics of Offset Requirements in the Tax Legislative
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light of this impasse, a pragmatic approach is to embrace a second-best
strategy that has proved useful with fiscal budgeting: requiring that to the
extent a new statute or appropriation increases carbon emissions, equal
or greater emissions reductions be found elsewhere from within the wing-
span of Congress. This strategy produces neither the most efficient emis-
sions reductions (as a carbon tax or cap and trade could) nor all the
emissions reduction necessary, but it launches emissions budgeting at the
federal legislative level in a way that begins to address the one percent
problem. With PAYGO, it does not matter whether a source affected by
legislation is one percent or less; what matters (for legislation as well as
for the atmospheric concentrations) is the net change in emissions aris-
ing from the legislation.26
We are not naı̈ve about the need for a greater sense of public ur-
gency and priority regarding climate change before the more costly as-
pects of our proposals could be adopted. But recent regulatory failures
on the global and federal levels suggest that more conventional propos-
als, such as carbon taxes and cap and trade programs, also are not feasi-
ble in the current political climate. It is also important to note at the
outset that we do not attempt to defend here the climate science that
calls for near-term reductions in GHG emissions. A wide variety of scien-
tific sources have recommended 50% global emissions reductions by
2050, including 80% emissions reductions from the United States and
other developed countries by 2050, and further steep reductions from
2050 to 2100, to reduce the likelihood of catastrophic climate effects.27
Others have carefully examined and explained those conclusions, which
have been relatively stable for almost a decade.28 In this Article, we take
these results as a given. Assuming there is a need to begin dramatic re-
ductions in our carbon emissions, we take our task to be designing inno-
Process, 65 U. Chi. L. Rev. 501, 515–43 (1998) [hereinafter Garrett, Harnessing]. For
examples of other legislative and executive precommitment climate strategies, see Richard
J. Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change: Restraining the Present to
Liberate the Future, 94 Cornell L. Rev. 1153, 1205–31 (2009); see also J.B. Ruhl & James
Salzman, Climate Change, Dead Zones, and Massive Problems in the Administrative State:
A Guide for Whittling Away, 98 Calif. L. Rev. 59, 94–98 (2010) [hereinafter Ruhl &
Salzman, Climate Change] (identifying administrative strategies for addressing climate
change); David A. Super, From the Greenhouse to the Poorhouse: Carbon-Emissions
Control and the Rules of Legislative Joinder, 158 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1093, 1121–43, 1157–96
(2010) (proposing legislative tools for regulating carbon emissions).
26. Cf. Vandenbergh & Steinemann, Carbon-Neutral, supra note 17, at 1717–22 R
(noting individuals may be unable to determine effects of their efforts to reduce carbon
emissions on overall climate problem but can be confident they are not contributing to
problem if they have no net emissions).
27. For a review of emissions targets, see Michael P. Vandenbergh, Brooke A. Ackerly
& Fred E. Forster, Micro-Offsets and Macro-Transformation: An Inconvenient View of
Climate Change Justice, 33 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 303, 315–17 (2009) [hereinafter
Vandenbergh et al., Micro-Offsets].
28. Id.; see also Jonathan B. Wiener, Think Globally, Act Globally: The Limits of Local
Climate Policies, 155 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1961, 1977 (2007) (discussing global targets and
difficulty of achieving international agreement).
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vative strategies that may increase the sense of urgency and priority re-
garding carbon emissions in the near term and that lay the foundation
for other, more demanding policies.
I. THE ONE PERCENT PROBLEM
We first provide a general account of the one percent problem, and
then in the next Part explain its particular impact on climate change pol-
icy. The one percent problem can arise in almost any regulatory area.
Simply stated, the one percent problem arises when the relatively small
size of low-percentage contributors is taken as a reason for exempting
those contributors from regulation despite the fact that the regulatory
problem cannot be solved without regulating those sources. At an ab-
stract level, the one percent problem is a special case of collective free
riding. If too many parties free ride, public goods are imperiled. So too
with the one percent problem: If too many parties are exempted based
on their relatively small size, then the goods the regulations seek to pro-
tect will not be created or protected.
What distinguishes the one percent problem from other forms of
free riding is the interaction between particular economic efficiency ar-
guments, cognitive biases, and the structure of certain social problems. At
its core, the one percent problem is generated by accepting efficiency
arguments under conditions where they are not justified. The way indi-
viduals perceive information, and in particular very low numbers, com-
pounds this effect. Section A addresses the economic grounding of the
one percent problem, and section B addresses its basis in how individuals
perceive very small numbers.
A. The Economics of Small Percentages
To understand the one percent problem, it makes sense to begin
with one percent arguments. These are arguments for avoiding regula-
tion based on one’s relatively small contribution to a problem, whether
that contribution is above or below one percent. We use “one percent” as
a shorthand for very small-share contributors, whether they are actually
one percent, a bit more, or less.
One percent arguments for exemption are frequently justified in ba-
sic economic terms. For decision makers, whether private businesses or
government regulators, it is often more efficient to focus on the most
significant contributors to a problem. If transportation amounts to 35%
of a business’s costs, or a single source contributes 40% of the pollutants
in a river, it often makes sense for the business manager seeking to re-
duce costs or the environmental regulator seeking to improve water qual-
ity to focus on those high-percentage contributors. The reason is that it is
only cost-effective to focus on the factors where the cost of doing so is less
than the benefit. Where the costs of addressing any particular one per-
cent source (or source category) exceed the benefits of doing so, it often
does not make sense to regulate that source. Given economies of scale, it
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is often the case that with small-percentage contributors the costs of regu-
lation exceed the benefits.29 As a result, a focus on high-percentage fac-
tors often concentrates effort and resources on the sources that may
make the most difference at the least expense.
This logic of high percentages has a corollary principle: So long as
there are high-percentage contributors, it does not make sense to con-
cern oneself with regulation of (relatively) small or (relatively) insignifi-
cant matters. Of course, to know whether a source is relatively small re-
quires a definition of the boundaries of the problem and a comparison.
But once that boundary definition is set, so long as there are significant
contributors, efficiency frequently directs attention away from small-per-
centage contributors; for them, the costs of regulating the source are pre-
sumed to exceed the benefits.
The law exempts small contributors and entities from regulation in a
wide range of areas. Although each exemption reflects considerations
specific to its particular area, these exemptions are grounded in part on
the assumption that extending regulation or liability to entities or actions
below a particular size threshold is not justified. Consider the following
examples:
Securities. — Section 3(b) of the Securities Act of 1933 provides the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) the power to exempt trans-
actions from the Act’s disclosure requirements “by reason of the small
amount involved or the limited character of the public offering.”30 Under
this authority, the SEC exempts securities offerings of less than $1 million
29. This is distinct from the problem of spending disproportionate amounts on
remedying the last 10% of a problem when the marginal costs escalate and benefits are
close to zero. See Stephen Breyer, Breaking the Vicious Circle: Toward Effective Risk
Regulation 12 (1993) (noting problem of spending 90% of program costs to eliminate last
10% of risk). A 2007 White Paper by the House of Representatives Commerce Committee
Staff concerning cap and trade legislation discusses at length the administrative burden
rationale for excluding large numbers of small source emitters, each of which would likely
contribute one percent or less to the overall climate change problem. The White Paper
expresses support for regulating greenhouse gas emissions, but argues that regulatory
benefits must be balanced with “the need to have a workable program” and further argues
there are “practical limits to the number and type of entities that can be directly
regulated.” Staff of H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, Subcomm. on Energy & Air
Quality, Climate Change Legislation Design White Paper: Scope of a Cap-and-Trade
Program 2 (2007) [hereinafter Scope of a Cap-and-Trade Program], available at http://
www.fws.gov/filedownloads/ftp_nctccsp/Climate%20Change%20Jumpdrive/References
%20and%20Resources/Policy/White_Paper.100307(2).pdf (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) (providing analysis of policy options for carbon mitigation). Thus, for example, the
White Paper recommends not regulating the agriculture sector “because of . . . the large
number of sources each with low emissions.” Id. at 22. For the electricity generation sector,
which the White Paper found accounted for one third of all U.S. greenhouse gas
emissions, id. at 11, the White Paper recommends—also on administrative burden
grounds—that private parties should be regulated only if they meet a threshold of 10,000
tons of CO2. Id. at 21.
30. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b) (2006).
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by non-reporting issuers31 from the mandatory disclosure obligations, in-
cluding registration, associated with public offerings.32
The SEC adopted these exemptions to eliminate the “disproportion-
ately burdensome” expense of registration for “small[ ] issuers that are
not subject to the public disclosure requirements.”33 Because the initial
registration for securities involves fixed costs to the issuer, “for relatively
small offerings, the cost of registration is proportionately too great com-
pared to the benefit.”34 Section 504 recognizes that in contrast to other
issuers, the benefit of compliance does not exceed the cost for these
small issuers.35
Superfund. — The Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 (often referred to as the
Superfund statute) creates a liability scheme to deter releases of hazard-
ous substances and to fund site cleanups.36 Although in theory the re-
lease of one molecule of a hazardous substance could trigger strict, joint
and several liability for Superfund site response costs,37 for many minor
contributors (in terms of the volume or toxicity of the materials disposed
of at the site) the costs of negotiating a settlement can be many times the
expected liability.38
In 1986, Congress amended the statute to encourage the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to settle the liability of “de
minimis” parties.39 Congress did not set an explicit percentage for eligi-
bility for a de minimis settlement, but the EPA in enforcement guidance
noted that the median settling party contributed 1% or less of the materi-
als containing hazardous substances to a Superfund site.40 In addition,
31. 17 C.F.R. § 230.504(b)(2) (2011).
32. 15 U.S.C. § 77e.
33. Securities Act Release No. 6339, [1981–1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) ¶ 83,014, at 84,457 (Aug. 7, 1981).
34. C. Steven Bradford, Transaction Exemptions in the Securities Act of 1933: An
Economic Analysis, 45 Emory L.J. 591, 602–14 (1996).
35. See Mark A. Sargent, The New Regulation D: Deregulation, Federalism and the
Dynamics of Regulatory Reform, 68 Wash. U. L.Q. 225, 279–81 (1990) (describing Rule
504 as intended to reduce small entities’ compliance costs). The exemption from federal
regulation does not, however, mean that these issuances are free of all regulatory burdens;
they still must comply with state securities laws.
36. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675 (2006).
37. See, e.g., B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha, 754 F. Supp. 960, 968–72 (D. Conn. 1991)
(discussing liability for municipal garbage).
38. See, e.g., Carol Dinkins, Settlement Issues in Federal Enforcement Actions 4 (June
2005) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.velaw.com/uploadedFiles/VE
site/Overview/Dinkins_Settlement_Issues.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(discussing possibility of “negotiation transaction costs . . . exceed[ing] . . . actual liability”).
39. See 42 U.S.C. § 9622(g) (authorizing de minimis settlements); see also Superfund
Program; Revised Model De Minimis Contributor Consent Decree and Administrative
Order on Consent, 60 Fed. Reg. 62,849, 62,853 (Dec. 7, 1995) (suggesting model consent
decree with contribution protection clause).
40. See Bruce Diamond, Dir., Office of Waste Programs Enforcement & William
White, Enforcement Counsel for Superfund Office, Office of Enforcement, OSWER
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more recent amendments to the statute have provided liability relief for
parties who have made even smaller contributions. Section 107(o) pro-
vides an exemption from liability for “de micromis” parties, defined as
those who can demonstrate that “the total amount of the material con-
taining hazardous substances . . . was less than 110 gallons of liquid
materials or 200 pounds of solid materials” and can meet other criteria.41
These exclusions reflect an assumption that larger contributors are availa-
ble to bear the lion’s share of the site clean-up costs.
Lobbying. — The Lobbying and Disclosure Act of 1995 aims to pro-
vide effective “public disclosure of the identity and extent of the efforts of
paid lobbyists to influence Federal officials in the conduct of Government
actions” in hopes it “will increase public confidence in the integrity of
Government.”42 Among other things, the Act requires lobbyists to regis-
ter with the Clerk of the House of Representatives and the Secretary of
the Senate,43 but it does not require registration for relatively low-value
lobbying efforts.44 In particular, the Act exempts from registration and
other filing requirements a person or entity whose “total income for mat-
ters related to lobbying activities on behalf of a particular client (in the
case of a lobbying firm) does not exceed and is not expected to exceed
$5,000” or whose total expenses for lobbying activities do not exceed
$20,000.45
These exemptions, and others like them,46 reflect pragmatic, eco-
nomic accommodations. The threshold requirement for regulation—
whether in securities, environmental regulation, or lobbying—stands as a
very rough proxy for the point at which the costs of compliance are likely
to exceed the benefits. What drives these exemptions is the relative cost
of compliance and the relatively small scope of the activities subject to the
exemptions. But this cost-benefit calculation should shift depending on
the proportion of activities that fall within the exemptions. While we
might quibble with the precise line at which these exemptions should be
triggered, the cost of these exemptions should be offset by the benefits of
compliance by other, larger contributors. The important point for our
Directive 9834.7-1D, Streamlined Approach for Settlements with De Minimis Waste
Contributors Under CERCLA Section 122(g)(1)(A), at 2 & n.5, 3 (July 30, 1993), available
at http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/policies/cleanup/superfund/app-
deminimis-rpt.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (noting EPA required no “set
percentage” for de minimis settlements, but that median amount of waste contributed was
one percent).
41. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(o) (creating “de micromis exception” to CERCLA liability).
42. 2 U.S.C. § 1601 (2006).
43. Id. § 1603(a)(1).
44. Id. § 1603(a)(3)(A).
45. Id.
46. 6 C.F.R. § 27.204(a)(1) (2011) (excluding toxic release of chemical in
concentration of less than 1% of mixture by weight from quantification requirements
applicable in facility-based screening); 29 C.F.R. § 1926.1101(k)(8)(vi)(B) (2011)
(exempting labeling of products containing asbestos if they contain less than 1%
concentrations).
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purposes is that the point at which the exemptions are made (or even if
they are made at all) should depend upon the value of compliance by
those who remain non-exempt. One percent arguments can provide an
economic basis for exclusion, but the validity of that basis depends criti-
cally on the surrounding landscape, and in particular on the relative con-
tributions of other potentially regulated parties.
The one percent problem results from embracing one percent argu-
ments outside of the conditions that justify accepting them. In the weak
form of the problem, a regulatory objective (say, cleaning up a Superfund
site) is achieved, but the exclusion of one percent sources increases the
net costs of the regulatory action or imposes an unfair distribution of
costs on larger contributors. Even though the marginal benefits of regu-
lating one percent sources may exceed the marginal costs, one percent
sources may still not be regulated if the notion that a one percent party is
inherently insignificant influences public opinion, political debates, and
the policymaking process. This weak form of the problem is potentially
widespread and important, but we have bigger fish to fry.
In the strong form of the one percent problem, which is our focus,
the exclusion of one percent sources leaves the regulatory problem un-
solved. The dynamic is straightforward. Although it may be cost-justified
to exclude small contributors from regulation when there are other
larger contributors, that calculus should shift if small contributors make
up a substantial share of the total contribution. Accepting one percent
arguments for exemption in those circumstances can sacrifice the net
benefits of the regulation.47 Though relatively straightforward to define,
one percent problems are difficult to solve. Part of the difficulty is that
one percent arguments invoke seemingly incontestable heuristic princi-
ples. No one stands for treating trifles as anything but. The key is to see
that defining something as a trifle depends on an assessment of the sur-
rounding landscape. The one percent problem results from taking con-
clusions about the value of compliance for small contributors under con-
ditions in which there are a significant number of larger contributors to a
setting in which there are not. Small potatoes might be discarded (or
47. It is important to distinguish one percent problems and the concept of de
minimis risk used in regulation. De minimis risk is a threshold “below which we would be
indifferent to changes in the level of risk,” and as a consequence the risk is excluded from
inquiry and regulation. Joseph Fiksel, De Minimis Risk: From Concept to Practice, in De
Minimis Risk 3, 4 (Chris Whipple ed., 1987); see also Joshua Menkes & R. Scott Frey, De
Minimis Risk as a Regulatory Tool, in De Minimis Risk, supra, at 9, 9. There is no necessary
connection between a one percent problem and a de minimis risk threshold. A de minimis
risk threshold pertains to levels of harm. In contrast, the one percent problem describes a
particular type of regulatory failure resulting from the exclusion of many small
contributors. Important instances of one percent problems, like climate change policy,
concern risks that are not de miminis. The closest point of connection between de minimis
risks and the one percent problem is that the one percent problem results from
acceptance of many individual contributors’ claims that their contributions are so small as
to not merit regulation, or “de minimis,” when in the aggregate those contributions pose
nontrivial risks.
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discardable), but the calculation for doing so changes if there are only
small potatoes.
B. Perception of Small Percentages
While economic grounds define the one percent problem, the diffi-
culty of confronting the problem is compounded by the way in which
individuals perceive very small numbers and low probabilities. Cognitive
psychologists have long understood that “[t]he way in which information
is . . . framed . . . influences how it is perceived and used.”48 This section
describes several psychological studies that show that individuals have dif-
ficulty making sense of low values and, in particular, low-value probabili-
ties. It then explains how these effects fuel the appeal of one percent
arguments.
1. Insensitivity to Low Probabilities. — A significant body of research
demonstrates that people have difficulty making sense of low-probability
risks and are insensitive to changes even in the orders of magnitude in
low probabilities.49 In a leading study, Howard Kunreuther, Nathan
Novemsky, and Daniel Kahneman demonstrated that individuals are un-
responsive to changes in probability magnitudes of 1 in 100,000, 1 in 1
million, and 1 in 10 million,50 and also insensitive to the differences be-
tween risks of 1 in 650, 1 in 6,300, and 1 in 68,000.51
Kunreuther and his co-authors reached these conclusions through
use of a sequence of contingent valuation experiments. They presented
individuals with a scenario in which an accident at a chemical plant would
pose risks to nearby residents of 1 death per 100,000, 1 million, or 10
million, and examined the subjects’ willingness to pay insurance premi-
ums at each of these risk levels. As a point of comparison, the subjects
were informed that the probability of an individual dying in a car acci-
dent is 1 in 6,000.52 The subjects showed virtually no greater willingness
48. Eric R. Stone, J. Frank Yates & Andrew M. Parker, Risk Communication: Absolute
Versus Relative Expressions of Low-Probability Risks, 60 Organizational Behav. & Hum.
Decision Processes 387, 387 (1994).
49. See Cass R. Sunstein, Probability Neglect: Emotions, Worst Cases, and Law, 112
Yale L.J. 61, 70 (2002) [hereinafter Sunstein, Probability Neglect] (noting many studies
show insensitivities to variations in low probabilities); Cass R. Sunstein, Terrorism and
Probability Neglect, 26 J. Risk & Uncertainty 121, 123 (2003) [hereinafter Sunstein,
Terrorism] (“It is . . . well known that people are insensitive to variations in low
probabilities.”).
50. Howard Kunreuther, Nathan Novemsky & Daniel Kahneman, Making Low
Probabilities Useful, 23 J. Risk & Uncertainty 103, 107–08 (2001) [hereinafter Kunreuther
et al., Low Probabilities]. De minimis risk thresholds themselves raise a host of theoretical
and practical problems. See Matthew D. Adler, Why De Minimis? 30–31 (Inst. for Law &
Econ., Univ. Pa. Law Sch., Research Paper No. 07-12, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=992878 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (arguing de minimis risk criteria
are not justified in ideal moral theory, and are justified, if at all, only on nonideal grounds
such as bounded rationality of government actors).
51. Kunreuther et al., Low Probabilities, supra note 50, at 108–09. R
52. Id. at 106.
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to pay to avoid the higher risks than the lower risks, despite the fact that
the size of the risks differed from one another by orders of magnitude.53
To test when sensitivity to probabilities would be triggered, Kunreuther
and his collaborators devised a second experiment using the same chemi-
cal plant scenario but with probabilities of death of 1 in 650, 1 in 6,300,
and 1 in 68,000.54 This experimental study revealed virtually the same
insensitivity to low-value probabilities as the first study.55
Other studies have also found that individuals have a difficult time
evaluating and making use of very low-value probabilities. One study
found that although individuals were willing to pay a premium for pro-
duce that was safer, the amount they were willing to pay was insensitive to
variations in lifetime cancer risk of between 3 to 50 additional cancer
cases per 50,000 consumers.56 Another study showed similarly small varia-
tion in individuals’ willingness to pay to reduce the risk of illness from
oysters.57 Still others have illustrated similar insensitivities.58
The conclusion that individuals have a difficult time evaluating low
probabilities should not be surprising: Individuals have little experience
with events that are by their nature very unlikely. Without a basis in expe-
rience or a strong comparison point, these differences, even in orders of
magnitude, are difficult to register. “For most of us, most of the time,” as
Cass Sunstein writes, “the relevant differences—between, say, 1/100,000
and 1/1,000,000—are not pertinent to our decisions, and by experience
we are not well equipped to take those differences into account.”59
2. Editing Small to Zero. — One possible explanation for insensitivity
to low-probability figures is the “editing hypothesis.”60 This hypothesis
posits that individuals extract the “gist of information” and make deci-
sions, when possible, on the basis of that gist.61
How individuals discern that “gist” is a complex matter. Studies have
shown that individuals have a “strongly bimodal” response to low-
53. Id. at 107–08.
54. Id. at 109.
55. Id.; see also Sunstein, Terrorism, supra note 49, at 123 (describing study as R
illustrating “striking form of probability neglect”).
56. Young Sook Eom, Pesticide Residue Risk and Food Safety Valuation: A Random
Utility Approach, 76 Am. J. Agric. Econ. 760, 764, 769 (1994) (“The price premium [for
safer produce] was insensitive to the amounts of risk reduction evaluated.”).
57. C.-T. Jordan Lin & J. Walter Milon, Contingent Valuation of Health Risk
Reductions for Shellfish Products, in Valuing Food Safety and Nutrition 83, 90–93 (Julie A.
Caswell ed., 1995).
58. See, e.g., Michael W. Jones-Lee, Graham Loomes & P.R. Philips, Valuing the
Prevention of Non-Fatal Road Injuries: Contingent Valuation vs. Standard Gambles, 47
Oxford Econ. Papers 676, 688–89 (1995) (showing willingness to pay only 20% more to
reduce risk from 12 in 100,000 to 4 in 100,000).
59. Sunstein, Probability Neglect, supra note 49, at 74. R
60. Stone et al., supra note 48, at 395. R
61. Id.
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probability risks:62 They tend either to dismiss low-probability risks63 or
overreact to them,64 depending on a mix of factors. These factors in-
clude, among others, emotion,65 the familiarity of the risk,66 the vividness
of the adverse outcome,67 and the presentation of the risk information.68
At the low end of this bimodal response, studies show there are cir-
cumstances in which individuals read the “gist” of the low-probability risk
as amounting to “essentially nil,” and thus not worth effort (or payment)
to prevent. In one classic study, Paul Slovic and co-authors examined indi-
viduals’ willingness to insure against low-probability but high-loss
events.69 The study showed that 80% of the subjects were not willing to
take out any insurance to prevent a loss with a probability of .001 (1 in
1,000), even though the losses were relatively high-value.70
Others have shown a similar effect, although the cut-off point for
treating a risk as “essentially nil” is variable. For instance, in one study, a
quarter of the subjects were unwilling to pay anything to eliminate a low-
probability risk with an incident rate of .000006 or .000003.71 In another
study, more than a quarter of the subjects were unwilling to pay anything
62. See Wesley A. Magat, W. Kip Viscusi & Joel Huber, Risk-Dollar Tradeoffs, Risk
Perceptions, and Consumer Behavior, in Learning about Risk: Consumer and Worker
Responses to Hazard Information 83, 91 (W. Kip Viscusi et al. eds., 1987) (noting study
participants “tend either to overreact to the risky event or to ignore it”); Gary H.
McClelland, William D. Schulze & Don L. Coursey, Insurance for Low-Probability Hazards:
A Bimodal Response to Unlikely Events, 7 J. Risk & Uncertainty 95, 108–09 (1993) (finding
bimodal response).
63. See, e.g., Howard Kunreuther et al., Disaster Insurance Protection: Public Policy
Lessons 185–86 (1978) (“[P]eople refuse to attend to or worry about losses whose
probability is below some threshold . . . . Probabilities below the threshold are essentially
treated as zero.”).
64. See Sarah Lichtenstein et al., Judged Frequency of Lethal Events, 4 J.
Experimental Psychol. 551, 552 (1978) (“Rare events may be overestimated because their
appearances are well spread and distinct.”); Magat et al., supra note 62, at 96 (concluding R
based on study that consumers overestimate likelihood of low-probability injuries); M.
Granger Morgan et al., On Judging the Frequency of Lethal Events: A Replication, 3 Risk
Analysis 11, 11 (1983) (“The results, which have been widely reproduced in the risk-
perception literature, show a tendency . . . to overestimate the incidence of rare causes of
death.”).
65. See George F. Loewenstein et al., Risk as Feelings, 127 Psychol. Bull. 267, 274
(2001) (showing emotional reactions to risk diverge from cognitive assessments).
66. See Paul Slovic, The Perception of Risk 14 (2000) (finding individuals’ choices to
insure are greatly affected by recent experiences, such as with floods and earthquakes).
67. See Paul Slovic, John Monahan & Donald C. MacGregor, Violence Risk
Assessment and Risk Communication, 24 Law & Hum. Behav. 271, 290 (2000) (attributing
greater response to risk in frequency format (e.g., “1 in 10”) than probability format (e.g.,
“10%”)).
68. See Stone et al., supra note 48, at 395 (finding individuals are more responsive to R
relative comparisons than to absolute probabilities).
69. Paul Slovic et al., Preference for Insuring Against Probable Small Losses:
Insurance Implications, 44 J. Risk & Ins. 237 (1977).
70. Id. at 243.
71. Stone et al., supra note 48, at 401. R
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to protect against a risk with a much higher probability, .01%.72 Although
more research needs to be done to discern the triggers that cause people
to ignore rather than to overestimate risks,73 what is important for our
purposes is that in some contexts, individuals treat low probabilities as
essentially zero probabilities.
3. Perception and the One Percent Problem. — This research on risk per-
ception sheds light on why one percent arguments can be so intuitively
appealing and why one percent problems are particular difficult to over-
come. When individuals respond to a low probability as if it is essentially
zero, one percent arguments may have powerful effects in policy debates,
even when they relate to small contributions to a problem as opposed to
small probabilities.
One way to see this is to consider how regulatory decisions, and in
particular decisions about whether to exempt a source or set a regulatory
threshold, can be framed. An exemption for a particular entity based on
it being a small part of the problem can be stated as accepting a small
increase in the probability of a particular undesired outcome. If, for ex-
ample, my company’s water discharge amounts to only 1% of the dis-
charge of a pollutant into a river, then providing an exemption to my
company is roughly equivalent to saying that a small increase in the
probability of the contaminants in water reaching a certain level is
acceptable.
If one percent arguments for exemption have effects similar to argu-
ments about the acceptability of very small increases in risks, then re-
search on risk perception should provide guidance on one percent
problems. It makes sense that the same effects that lead to insensitivity in
perception of small risks also would lead to insensitivity in the perception
of small contributions to a larger problem. In both cases, individuals are
confronted with numbers that are difficult to evaluate; and in both cases,
a course of action will have a very small and difficult-to-evaluate change in
the likelihood of events. If it is difficult for individuals to make sense of
differences stated in terms of risk, it also may be difficult for individuals
to make sense of differences stated in terms of equivalently small contri-
butions to a problem.
Indeed, it may well be that the dynamic of individuals reading small
probabilities as amounting to zero is even stronger in regulatory contexts.
The benefits of regulation frequently do not follow for some time. More-
over, the benefits of regulations are often public goods. Where regula-
tions produce public goods in the future, small increases in the likeli-
hood of low-probability events may be particularly difficult for individuals
to evaluate.
72. McClelland et al., supra note 62, at 103 (1993). R
73. See, e.g., Kunreuther et al., Low Probabilities, supra note 50, at 117 (suggesting R
that risk perception is “highly context dependent” and calling for further research beyond
experimental tests using insurance premiums).
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Psychologists themselves are not immune from these types of percep-
tion effects,74 and there is no reason to believe that policymakers are ei-
ther. Policymaking is also influenced by public perception. For example,
studies suggest that the allocation of risk reduction resources by the EPA
more closely tracks public perceptions of risk than experts’ views.75 Biases
in public perceptions are thus likely to affect policies even where policy-
makers and other experts are able to avoid these biases. Part of the diffi-
culty in addressing one percent problems is overcoming the intuitive ap-
peal of disregarding what we assume to be small potatoes.
II. THE ONE PERCENT PROBLEM AND CLIMATE CHANGE
The one percent problem has particularly detrimental effects on cli-
mate change policy. Solving the climate change problem will be far more
difficult, if not impossible, without addressing sources that could frame
themselves as one percent contributors. At a global level, countries that
individually contribute less than one percent of global emissions collec-
tively account for roughly 30 to 40% of total current emissions and a
large share of projected future emissions. Many economic sectors at the
global and national level can also be framed as contributing one percent
or less of global emissions. The drastic reductions in emissions that cli-
mate science calls for will not be practically achievable without including
reductions from many sources that can be framed in one percent terms.
One percent arguments are frequently voiced to evade costly emissions
reductions, and appear to be influential in climate change debates. In
this Part, we explain why one percent sources are critical to solving the
climate change problem and then demonstrate the range and currency
of one percent arguments—in legislative and regulatory spheres—that
create the one percent problem for climate change.
A. Climate Change and One Percent Sources of Carbon Emissions
1. The Climate Change Problem. — To understand the importance of
one percent sources to climate change policy, it is necessary to under-
stand the structure of the climate change problem. Climate scientists
have concluded that tipping points exist for atmospheric concentrations
of carbon. Once these tipping points are passed, efforts to reduce carbon
emissions may be swamped by natural emissions and we may not be able
to avoid catastrophic climate change. Although, as a general rule, reduc-
74. Cf. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Belief in the Law of Small Numbers, 76
Psychol. Bull. 105, 110 (1974) (concluding psychologists are subject to behavioral
anomalies regarding small numbers).
75. See Sci. Advisory Bd., Envtl. Prot. Agency, Reducing Risk: Setting Priorities and
Strategies for Environmental Protection 12 (1990) (“Federal environmental laws are more
reflective of public perceptions of risk than of scientific understanding.”); Envtl. Prot.
Agency, Unfinished Business: A Comparative Assessment of Environmental Problems 96
(1987) (“EPA’s priorities appear more closely aligned with public opinion than with
estimated risks.”).
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ing anthropogenic carbon emissions will reduce global average tempera-
tures over the long run, once emissions push temperatures past particular
levels—levels that are very difficult, if not impossible, to identify in ad-
vance—any of several feedback effects may occur (e.g., releases of carbon
from drying Amazonian and other tropical forests, reductions in reflectiv-
ity, or albedo, from melting ice and snow,76 releases of methane from
thawing Arctic and Subarctic tundra, releases of methane clathrates from
warming ocean sediments and continental deposits).77 These feedback
effects may lead to the release of massive amounts of carbon from natural
sources, which will further increase temperature and trigger additional
feedback effects. And so on. Once these feedback effects begin, increases
in natural carbon emissions may exceed any plausible reductions in an-
thropogenic emissions.
These feedback effects suggest that identifying and achieving a social
goal for carbon emissions that is below the difficult-to-identify tipping
points is particularly important. Yet current economic integrated assess-
ment models have difficulty accounting for these climate tipping
points.78 Achieving a carbon emissions target that appears on the surface
to be socially optimal because the estimated costs of reducing emissions
are less than the estimated benefits of reducing climate change harms
may still lead to catastrophic climate change if the target is higher than a
threshold or tipping point for feedback effects.
Even if catastrophic climate change occurs, some might argue, the
costs could be less than the costs of anthropogenic carbon emissions re-
76. The feedback effects in the Arctic arising from reduced albedo are the subject of
debate in the scientific literature. See Steven C. Amstrup et al., Greenhouse Gas Mitigation
Can Reduce Sea-Ice Loss and Increase Polar Bear Persistence, 468 Nature 955, 957–58
(2010) (discussing albedo effects of carbon mitigation on polar bear populations).
77. For a discussion of feedback effects, see Mark Lynas, Six Degrees: Our Future on a
Hotter Planet (2008); see also Working Grp. II, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change, Fourth Assessment Report: Summary for Policymakers 19 (M.L. Parry et al. eds.,
2007) [hereinafter Summary for Policymakers], available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/
assessment-report/ar4/wg2/ar4-wg2-spm.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(discussing feedback effects).
78. See Freeman & Guzman, supra note 18, at 1554 (examining how economic R
models fail to account fully for catastrophic climate outcomes); Jonathan S. Masur & Eric
A. Posner, Climate Regulation and the Limits of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 99 Calif. L. Rev.
(forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 19, 23–24), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1662147 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (noting that leading models of
climate policy costs and benefits “may be underestimating the probability of catastrophic
events by significant margins” and thus understating benefits of emissions reductions);
Vandenbergh et al., Micro-Offsets, supra note 27, at 317–19 (discussing unreliability of R
atmospheric target assumptions in leading proposed policies); Martin L. Weitzman, On
Modeling and Interpreting the Economics of Catastrophic Climate Change, 91 Rev. Econ.
& Stat. 1, 2 (2009) (examining how climate models fail to account for fat-tailed risks);
Martin L. Weitzman, A Review of the Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change,
45 J. Econ. Literature 703, 704–05 (2007) (“[S]tandard approaches to climate change . . .
fail to account fully for the implications of large consequences with small
probabilities . . . .”).
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ductions, or could occur so far out in the future that we simply do not or
should not care about the costs. Paleoclimatologists have identified cli-
mate, sea level, and ocean acidification shifts during periods in geologic
history, however, that, if they recur, could cause widespread, systemic
harms that are beyond current methods of cost calculation and are not
accounted for in the most widely used economic models.79 For example,
a recent study in a leading peer-reviewed journal raises the possibility that
heat waves could place in doubt the ability of large percentages of
humans to survive outdoors in large areas of the world in roughly three
centuries.80 It is not possible to quantify the likelihood of these cata-
strophic outcomes, but they are disturbingly plausible, largely irreversi-
ble, and not subject to adaptation in any meaningful sense.81 In short, if
the one percent problem induces a failure to reduce emissions below tip-
ping points, the resulting conditions may not allow a simple economic
reevaluation to impose new limits on small emissions sources at a later
date based on a new calculus that the marginal benefit appears to be
greater than the marginal cost. Instead, the result may be a climate catas-
trophe that is beyond regulation by the time it is recognized.82
To reduce the likelihood that the feedback effects associated with
catastrophic climate change will occur, a consensus has emerged that the
global average temperature increase above pre-industrial levels should
not exceed 2°C (3.6°F).83 To limit to 50% the likelihood that the 2°C
threshold will be exceeded, many climate scientists have concluded that
carbon dioxide atmospheric concentrations should not exceed 450 parts
79. For a description of some of these economic models, see Masur & Posner, supra
note 78, (manuscript at 17–19). R
80. See Steven C. Sherwood & Matthew Huber, An Adaptability Limit to Climate
Change Due to Heat Stress, 107 Proc. Nat’l Acad. Sci. U.S. 9552, 9552 (2010) (“[R]ecent
estimates of the costs of unmitigated climate change are too low unless the range of
possible warming can somehow be narrowed.”); see also Anthony J. McMichael & Keith
B.G. Dear, Climate Change: Health, Heat, and Longer Horizons, 107 Proc. Nat’l Acad. Sci.
U.S. 9483, 9483–84 (2010) (commenting on Sherwood and Huber study).
81. See, e.g., Nicholas Stern, The Economics of Climate Change, 98 Am. Econ. Rev. 1,
5 tbl.1 (2008) (providing likelihoods of temperature increases based on studies conducted
by Hadley Center and published in Stern Review). For a discussion of irreversible harms,
see generally Cass R. Sunstein, Irreversible and Catastrophic, 91 Cornell L. Rev. 841
(2006).
82. See Susan Solomon et al., Irreversible Climate Change Due to Carbon Dioxide
Emissions, 106 Proc. Nat’l Acad. Sci. U.S. 1704, 1704 (2009) (“[T]he climate change that
takes place due to increases in carbon dioxide concentration is largely irreversible for
1,000 years after emissions stop.”).
83. See, e.g., Summary for Policymakers, supra note 77, at 16 fig.2 (charting R
temperature targets and atmospheric concentrations); see also U.N. Human Development
Report 2007/2008, Fighting Climate Change: Human Solidarity in a Divided World 26, 46
(2007) [hereinafter U.N. Development Report], available at http://hdr.undp.org/en/
media/HDR_20072008_EN_Complete.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(describing 2°C as “potential ‘tipping point’ for long-run catastrophic outcomes”).
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per million (ppm).84 The 50% chance of 2°C at 450 ppm CO2 is not a
guarantee. Even 450 ppm of CO2, leaves an uncomfortably large likeli-
hood of temperature increases far above 2°C.85 As a result, some have
suggested that 350 ppm CO2 is the better target.86 For the purposes of
this Article, however, we assume a 450 ppm target. The conclusions we
reach are all the more relevant if the appropriate target is 350 ppm as
opposed to 450 ppm.
To achieve a 450 ppm target will require leveling off global emissions
in the near future, and global emissions reductions of 50% or more from
1990 levels by 2050.87 This 50% emissions reduction must be achieved
against a backdrop of a doubling of global emissions under projected
business-as-usual scenarios.88 Most of the emissions growth will occur in
developing countries that have the strongest need to alleviate poverty and
have played a small role in creating the current climate crisis.89 Given the
disparity in poverty and development levels around the world, and the
historical contributions to atmospheric carbon concentrations of many
developed countries, climate change researchers have set a goal for the
United States and other developed countries of leveling off or reducing
emissions during this decade, with 80% emissions reductions from 1990
levels by 2050.90 Because a substantial proportion of the carbon dioxide
released today will remain in the atmosphere hundreds of years from
84. Working Grp. III, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Fourth
Assessment Report: Summary for Policymakers 15 tbl.5 (2007), available at http://
www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg3/ar4-wg3-spm.pdf (on file with the Columbia
Law Review).
85. See Stern, supra note 81, at 5 tbl.1 (providing likelihoods of temperature R
increases at various atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide equivalents).
86. See James Hansen et al., Dangerous Human-Made Interference with Climate: A
GISS ModelE Study, 7 Atmospheric Chemistry & Physics 2287, 2304–08 (2007) (“[A] CO2
level exceeding ~450 ppm is almost surely dangerous, and the ceiling may be even lower.”);
James Hansen et al., Target Atmospheric CO2: Where Should Humanity Aim?, 2 Open
Atmospheric Sci. J. 217, 217–18, 226 (2008) [hereinafter Hansen et al., Target] (“An initial
CO2 target of 350 ppm, to be reassessed as effects on ice sheet mass balance are observed,
is suggested.”).
87. U.N. Development Report, supra note 83, at 48. R
88. See S. Pacala & R. Socolow, Stabilization Wedges: Solving the Climate Problem for
the Next 50 Years with Current Technologies, 305 Science 968, 968–69 (2004) (describing
2050 emissions projections and targets under business-as-usual trajectory, i.e., those “likely
to occur in the absence of a focus on carbon”).
89. See Roadmap to Copenhagen—Driving Towards Success: Hearing Before the H.
Select Comm. on Energy Independence & Global Warming, 111th Cong. 9, 13 (2009)
(statement of Todd Stern, Special Envoy for Climate Change, U.S. Department of State),
available at http://globalwarming.house.gov/files/HRG/FullTranscripts/111-9_2009-09-
10.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (noting “97 percent of the projected increase
in global emissions between now and 2030 will come from developing countries,” which
“tend to see a problem not of their own making that they are being asked to fix”).
90. See, e.g., Cal. Exec. Order No. S-3-05 (June 1, 2005), available at http://
www.dot.ca.gov/hq/energy/ExecOrderS-3-05.htm (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(adopting California goal of 80% emissions reductions from 1990 levels by 2050); U.N.
Development Report, supra note 83, at 111–17 (calling for 80% reduction from 1990 levels R
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now,91 the recent delays in achieving policies that will reduce emissions
by 2020 have increased the stringency of the emissions reductions that
will need to occur by 2050. After 2050, global emissions will need to con-
tinue to decline, ultimately approaching near-zero anthropogenic emis-
sions levels.92
2. Sources of Carbon Emissions. — The one percent problem is particu-
larly acute for climate change because a substantial share of all carbon
emissions arises from sources that can easily be framed as contributing
one percent or less to the total. We examine the data on carbon emis-
sions through the lens of the various types of one percent arguments that
are available to carbon sources (e.g., less than 2%, less than 1.5%, etc.).
For example, Figure 1 demonstrates that only seven countries had an in-
dividual share of 2% or more of all anthropogenic global carbon dioxide
equivalent (CO2-e) emissions in 2006.93
by rich countries by 2050 and noting targets already set by some nations and their political
subdivisions).
91. See Nathan S. Lewis & Daniel G. Nocera, Powering the Planet: Chemical
Challenges in Solar Energy Utilization, 103 Proc. Nat’l Acad. Sci. U.S. 15,729, 15,730
(2006) (“[W]hatever environmental effects might be caused by this atmospheric CO2
accumulation over the next 40–50 yr will persist globally for the next 500–2,000 yr or
more.”).
92. See, e.g., Pacala & Socolow, supra note 88, at 968–69 (describing potential steps to R
reduce carbon emissions over next 50 years).
93. World Res. Inst., Climate Analysis Indicators Tool (CAIT), Total GHG Emissions
in 2006 Per Country (2010), http://cait.wri.org/cait.php?page=yearly&mode=view (on file
with the Columbia Law Review). For this analysis, the data are presented based on a
threshold of 1.99%. The CO2-e emissions totals exclude emissions from land use. See U.S.
Energy Info. Admin. (EIA), World Carbon Dioxide Emissions from the Use of Fossil Fuels,
http://www.eia.doe.gov/iea/carbon.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (last
visited Aug. 26, 2011) (providing tables of world carbon dioxide emissions from use of
fossil fuels). For a discussion of CO2-e as a unit of measurement, see supra note 13.
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Total Below 1.9% (36.47%)
In other words, only seven countries, representing roughly 64% of
global CO2-e emissions, cannot argue they contribute less than 2% of
global emissions. Almost 180 countries, representing more than 36% of
all emissions, can make this form of the one percent argument. As Figure
2 demonstrates, of these 180 countries, all but four can argue not just
that they contribute less than 2%, but also that they contribute less than
1.5% of global emissions.





















Total Below 1.49% (29.76%)
20.17%
29.76%
The twelve countries whose individual contribution is more than
1.5% of emissions only account for roughly 70% of emissions. The other
94. World Res. Inst., supra note 93. For this analysis, we treat a country as having 1% R
or less if its percentage would be rounded to 1% using standard rounding norms (i.e., if it
is 1.49% or less of the global total).
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30% of all global CO2-e emissions are produced by the 173 countries that
can make this form of the one percent argument.
If the goal is to reduce global emissions by 50% by 2050, it is mathe-
matically possible to achieve that goal if the countries that can make one
percent arguments are excluded, but it will be remarkably costly and
probably not politically feasible. The emissions from countries that can-
not make the one percent argument would need to be decreased by 75 to
90%, yet the list of these countries includes several for which, at least for
the next few decades, there is no reasonable prospect for reductions from
current levels, much less from 1990 levels. Examples include India, which
has per capita emissions of roughly two tons per year, and China, at
roughly five tons per year, as compared to roughly twenty tons per year
for the United States and roughly ten tons for Japan and many European
countries.95 Furthermore, if the global emissions reduction goal is an
80% reduction by 2050, as some have argued,96 it is mathematically im-
possible to achieve the goal without the countries that can make the one
percent argument.
A second framing of the relevant contributions from each nation fur-
ther demonstrates the point. Many developing countries argue that the
appropriate criterion for evaluating responsibility for reducing emissions
is not annual emissions or “flows” of carbon into the atmosphere, but the
total amounts or “stocks” that remain in the atmosphere based on the
total national emissions since the start of the industrial revolution.97 This
argument essentially asserts that developed nations benefited dispropor-
tionately from the industrial revolution and should therefore bear a
larger share of the burden of reducing prospective emissions. Moreover,
although some carbon is removed from the atmosphere through natural
processes (e.g., through dissolution into the oceans, uptake by plants,
and other processes), a substantial percentage of total carbon emissions
will remain in the atmosphere for 100 or even 1,000 years.98
Figure 3 demonstrates that the one percent problem also arises if we
examine relative contributions in terms of a country’s share of stocks of
carbon dioxide in the atmosphere.
95. See Vandenbergh et al., Micro-Offsets, supra note 27, at 323–24 (discussing per
capita emissions).
96. Hansen et al., Target, supra note 86, at 229 (“We suggest an initial objective of R
reducing atmospheric CO2 to 350 ppm, with the target to be adjusted as scientific
understanding and empirical evidence of climate effects accumulate.”).
97. See, e.g., Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Climate Change Justice, 96 Geo. L.J.
1565, 1611–12 (2008) (discussing carbon stocks and flows).
98. See, e.g., Lewis & Nocera, supra note 91, at 15,730 (discussing carbon residence R
times in atmosphere).
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Total Below 1.9% (25.80%)
8.10%
Using the stocks approach, only eleven countries, accounting for
roughly 75% of emissions, cannot argue they have contributed less than
2% of the existing carbon stock. The 174 countries that can argue they
have contributed less than 2% of existing stocks account for roughly 25%
of all global CO2-e emissions.100
Third, if we change focus from nations to economic sectors at the
global level, entire economic sectors can be framed as one percent
sources. For example, global air transport accounts for only around 3%
of anthropogenic global warming.101 Global shipping accounts for com-
parable levels of emissions.102
99. Figure based on data presented in Kevin A. Baumert, Timothy Herzog & Jonathan
Pershing, Word Res. Inst., Navigating the Numbers: Greenhouse Gas Data and
International Climate Policy 32 fig.6.1 (2005), available at http://pdf.wri.org/
navigating_numbers.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
100. Only twelve countries, accounting for roughly 76% of the world’s carbon stocks,
cannot claim that they have contributed less than 1.5% of CO2-e emissions to the world’s
stocks.
101. Aviation Industry Pushes for Global Deal to Address Sector’s Greenhouse
Emissions, Int’l Env’t Rep. (BNA), Sept. 29, 2010, at 954 (discussing views of industry
executives that aviation accounts for 2% of global carbon dioxide emissions); see also
Aviation and the Environment: Emmissions [sic]: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Aviation of the H. Comm. on Transp. & Infrastructure, 110th Cong. 92 (2008) (statement
of Gerald Dillingham, Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues, U.S. Government
Accountability Office) [hereinafter Dillingham statement] (“A 1999 study by the United
Nations’ Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) estimated that global
aircraft emissions generally accounted for approximately 3.5 percent of the warming
generated by human activity.”).
102. See Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev., Int’l Transp. Forum, Reducing
Transport Greenhouse Gas Emissions: Trends and Data 10 (2010), available at http://
www.internationaltransportforum.org/Pub/pdf/10GHGTrends.pdf (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (noting that shipping accounts for 3% of global fossil-fuel-based
emissions).
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Economic sectors at the U.S. domestic level also can be framed ei-
ther as one percent contributors to anthropogenic emissions103 or in
ways that do not reveal the one percent problem. For example, Figure 4
demonstrates how the annual EPA GHG inventory, the leading U.S. docu-
ment that identifies sources of carbon emissions, frames emissions from
economic sectors: Electricity Generation (34% of U.S. emissions);
Transportation (28%); Industry (19%); Agriculture (8%); Commercial
(6%); Residential (5%).104 None are below 1%, so long as the sectors are
treated as a whole and the denominator is U.S. emissions. If the denomi-
nator is global emissions, however, several of these sectors can make a
one percent argument based on their relatively small contributions.
































*excludes US Territories and emission sinks
MMTCO2eq = Million Metric Tons Carbon Dioxide Equivalents
In addition, policy debates typically do not focus at a general sectoral
level, but focus instead at the level of more specific industrial or commer-
cial sectors. For example, in the policy debate, aircraft emissions are
often considered in isolation from the larger transportation sector.106 Fig-
ure 5 demonstrates the percentage share of emissions attributable to each
of the roughly 390 industrial sectors in the United States.
103. See Scope of a Cap-and-Trade Program, supra note 29, at 7 & fig.2 (analyzing R
sources of domestic carbon emissions).
104. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks:
1990–2005, at 2-22 to -23 (2007), available at http://epa.gov/climatechange/emissions/
downloads06/07CR.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (providing estimates of
percentage of direct U.S. greenhouse gas emissions by economic sector for 2005).
105. Scope of a Cap-and-Trade Problem, supra note 29, at 7 & fig.2 R
106. See, e.g., Dillingham statement, supra note 101 (noting “aviation accounts for R
about 2.7% of the total U.S. contribution of greenhouse gas emissions”).
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FIGURE 5: DIRECT AND INDIRECT INDUSTRY EMISSIONS, BY INDUSTRY107
Other aggregate
industries with less















































Although Figure 5 includes roughly 390 specific industrial sectors,
only a small handful are above 1.99% of the overall industrial sector total,
much less the U.S. or global total. The specific industry sectors that can
make a one percent argument account for roughly 22% of the total from
all of industry, and many of the specific industrial sectors that contribute
the remaining 78% are composites of smaller subsectors. In addition,
some sectors have shown a willingness to make one percent arguments
based on a share in the 3 to 4% range.108 If we exclude from the total
those specific industrial sectors whose share of all industry emissions are
4% or below, these “one percent” candidates account for roughly 58% of
the total from the overall industrial sector. If these sources are excluded,
it will be impossible to achieve the overall industrial sector’s share of U.S.
total reductions, whether the target is 50% or 80%. If the denominator is
107. Econ. & Statistics Admin., U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, U.S. Carbon Dioxide
Emissions and Intensities Over Time: A Detailed Accounting of Industries, Government
and Households 7, app. tbls.A-60, A-61, A-62 & A-63 (2010), available at http://
www.esa.doc.gov/sites/default/files/reports/documents/tablesa60-a63.xls (on file with
the Columbia Law Review) (providing industry sector-level data for total CO2 emissions in
1998, 2002, and 2006). The full report is available at http://www.esa.doc.gov/sites/
default/files/reports/documents/co2reportfinal.pdf and the appendix is available at
http://www.esa.doc.gov/sites/default/files/reports/documents/appendix_0.pdf. Totals
in the original are in million metric tons. Summing of sectors may generate double-
counting.
108. See discussion infra Part II.B.
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total U.S. emissions or total global emissions, rather than just emissions
from the U.S. industrial sector, nearly all of the specific industrial sectors
can make the one percent argument.
B. One Percent Arguments in the Political and Legal Arenas
Opponents of climate change mitigation measures often make one
percent arguments to defeat efforts to take any regulatory action or to
shift potential regulatory burdens to other emissions sources. In interna-
tional debates, advocates for nations ranging from the United States,109
India,110 and Bangladesh111 to groups of nations in the Middle East112
have raised the one percent argument. On a global sectoral level, the
trade association representing the international airline industry has ar-
gued that the air transport sector is being “unfairly targeted” in efforts to
reduce air carbon emissions because the sector only contributes roughly
3% to anthropogenic global warming.113
109. See  Martin Feldstein, Op-Ed., Cap and Trade: All Cost, No Benefit, Wash. Post,
June 1, 2009, at A15 (arguing that because “a 15 percent fall in U.S. CO2 output would
lower global CO2 output by less than 4 percent” and “would be virtually unnoticeable  . . .
[t]he U.S. should wait until there is a global agreement on CO2 that includes China and
India before committing to costly reductions in the United States”); This Week with
George Stephanopoulos (ABC television broadcast June 28, 2009), transcript available at
http://abcnews.go.com/ThisWeek/Politics/story?id=7948866&page=8 (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (showing Sen. Charles Grassley arguing against cap and trade
legislation “because if the United States moves ahead by itself, we’re not only going to lose
those jobs, but the point is, after 30 or 40 years, we’re going to reduce CO2 by less than 1
percent”).
110. The Indian press has noted that India only contributed 3% of the stock of
greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, as compared to 28% for the United States. See, e.g.,
D. Balasubramanian, Climate Change and the Copenhagen Discord, Hindu (Feb. 10,
2010), http://www.thehindu.com/sci-tech/science/article104597.ece (on file with the
Columbia Law Review).
111. See Stobo Sniderman, The Era of Carbon Conditionality, Global Brief (Nov. 22,
2010), http://globalbrief.ca/blog/2010/11/22/the-era-of-carbon-conditionality (on file
with the Columbia Law Review) (noting that because Bangladesh “emits less than a fifth of
one percent of the world’s total emissions” it “wants aid to help it adapt to climate change,
not to reduce its emissions”); see also Cass R. Sunstein, The World vs. The United States
and China? The Complex Climate Change Incentives of the Leading Greenhouse Gas
Emitters, 55 UCLA L. Rev. 1675, 1688 (2008) (noting African nations are “trivial
greenhouse gas emitters”).
112. See Oli Brown & Alec Crawford, Int’l Inst. for Sustainable Dev., Rising
Temperatures, Rising Tensions: Climate Change and the Risk of Violent Conflict in the
Middle East 29 (2009), available at http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2009/rising_temps_middle_
east.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (arguing that developing nations in the
Levant—Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and the occupied Palestinian territory—which as a region
produces less than one percent of global GHG emissions, may come to further resent
Western nations and Israel if Copenhagen fails to produce meaningful concessions from
developed countries).
113. See supra note 101 and accompanying text; note 106 and accompanying text. R
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At the domestic level, which is our focus, many parties make one
percent arguments in legal and policy debates.114 One percent argu-
ments have particular force in legislative and regulatory debates, where
parties argue for exclusion from regulation due to the regulatory burden
on large numbers of small sources.115
The opportunities to frame large carbon sources as one percent or
less are almost limitless, and entities from across the political spectrum
have availed themselves of these arguments. For example, coal industry
advocates have used the one percent argument to cast doubt on the an-
thropogenic contribution to climate change and to argue against impos-
ing carbon emissions limits on coal-fired electric generating facilities.116
At the same time, supporters of regulating carbon emissions from coal-
fired electric generating facilities have asserted that regulation is neces-
sary in part because alternatives—such as reducing emissions through ef-
ficiency or conservation measures—generate small reductions.117 One
114. Some parties do not use the one percent framing to undercut perceived
obligations to reduce emissions, but rather to acknowledge their contribution and to
support mitigation efforts. See City of New York, PlaNYC, A Greener, Greater New York
150 (2011),  available at http://nytelecom.vo.llnwd.net/o15/agencies/planyc2030/pdf/
planyc_201_planyc_full_report.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (outlining city’s
carbon mitigation actions); see also Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), Declaration
on Climate Change 2009 ¶ 11 (2009), available at http://aosis.info/documents/AOSIS
%20Summit%20Declaration%20Sept%2021%20FINAL.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) (“[W]hile SIDS contribute the least to global emissions . . . our nations continue to
take significant actions towards the reduction of our own emissions including through
regional and inter-regional energy initiatives.”). The California Environmental Protection
Agency Air Resources Board provides another useful example. The Board specifically
stated it is “clear” emissions from light duty vehicles in California contribute “less than 1
percent” of global greenhouse gas emissions. Nonetheless, the Board found “it does not
necessarily follow” that such light-duty vehicles should not be regulated in California. Cal.
Envtl. Prot. Agency Air Res. Bd., Initial Statement of Reasons for Proposed Rulemaking,
Public Hearing to Consider Adoption of Regulations to Control Greenhouse Gas
Emissions from Motor Vehicles 145 (Aug. 6, 2004), available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/
regact/grnhsgas/isor.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
115. See, e.g., Scope of a Cap-and-Trade Problem, supra note 29, at 9 & fig.2 R
(pointing to small residential share of total domestic carbon emissions as basis for focusing
on other emissions source categories).
116. See National Energy Policy: Coal: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Energy &
Air Quality of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 107th Cong. 48–49 (2001)
(statement of J. Brett Harvey, President, CONSOL Energy) (opposing inclusion of carbon
dioxide in multi-pollutant clean air bill, stating, “[w]hile the human involvement in this
growth represents less than one percent of greenhouse gas emissions, being emissions
from motor vehicles, power plants, factories, homes, disposal sites, and, yes, even mines,”
U.S. national energy policy should examine other means to mitigate greenhouse gas
emissions).
117. See David Henderson, Op-Ed., Let There Be (Incandescent) Light, Wash. Post,
Oct. 2, 2009, at A21 (“Banning traditional light bulbs as used in private homes seems an
[environmental protection] effort [with] very little payoff . . . . Congress should regulate
matters that require the force of law, such as banning mountaintop removal in coal mining
and new coal-burning power plants. Leave people to change their own light bulbs.”); see
also Mike Tidwell, Op-Ed., To Really Save the Planet, Stop Going Green, Wash. Post, Dec.
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percent arguments also have been made in opposition to efforts to re-
duce carbon emissions from personal motor vehicle idling,118 even
though a recent study suggests that idling interventions could reasonably
be expected to reduce almost 16 million metric tons of carbon dioxide,
or 0.3% of U.S. emissions, a total equal to all of the emissions from the
ammonia industry.119
The one percent argument also has been used to downplay the con-
tribution of the U.S. Department of Defense to energy use and carbon
emissions. The Department of Defense consumed 890 trillion BTUs of
energy in 2008.120 Representatives of the Department framed this as
“more than half of the federal government’s energy consumption” but at
the same time as “less than one percent of total U.S. energy consump-
tion.”121 If we examine just the use of petroleum, the Department of
Defense “consumes more than 300,000 barrels of oil a day” but represent-
atives of the Department cast this as only “about 1.7 percent of the total
for the United States and about 0.35 percent of the world’s total oil
consumption.”122
Agencies have used the one percent argument on numerous occa-
sions to avoid preparing National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)
Environmental Impact Statements for major federal actions or to down-
play the impacts of an action. Perhaps the most striking example is the
specific lease sale that enabled the drilling of the BP Macondo Well,
where the U.S. Department of the Interior concluded that the carbon
emissions from the oil to be pumped from the leased property would not
be significant and that “[t]he effect of proposed-[Lease Sale 206]-related
6, 2009, at B1 (“Instead of continuing our faddish and counterproductive emphasis on
small, voluntary actions, we should follow the example of Americans during past moral
crises and work toward large-scale change.”). One percent arguments against reducing
household demand come from the right as well as the left. See, e.g., Joseph Kahn, Cheney
Promotes Increasing Supply as Energy Policy, N.Y. Times, May 1, 2001, at A1 (noting Vice
President Dick Cheney’s assertion that “[c]onservation may be a sign of personal virtue,
but it is not a sufficient basis for a sound, comprehensive energy policy”).
118. See Brendan I. Koerner, Is an Idle Car the Devil’s Workshop?, Slate (May 27,
2008), http://www.slate.com/id/2192187/ (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(“[C]utting out idling, though certainly advisable, isn’t going to . . . make a huge dent in
our national carbon footprint. . . . [It] would represent about 0.2 percent of the carbon
dioxide that was emitted in the United States in 2006.”).
119. Amanda R. Carrico et al., Costly Myths: An Analysis of Idling Beliefs and
Behavior in Personal Motor Vehicles, 37 Energy Pol’y 2881, 2884 (2009).
120. Sustainable Energy and the Federal Government: Hearing Before the S.
Subcomm. on Fed. Fin. Mgmt., Gov’t Info., Fed. Servs., & Int’l Sec. of the S. Comm. on
Homeland Sec. & Gov’t Affairs, 111th Cong. 2 (Jan. 27, 2010) (statement of Dr. Dorothy
Robyn, Deputy Under Secretary for Installations and Environment, U.S. Department of
Defense), available at http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Hearings.
Hearing&Hearing_id=c7cb1779-8aa1-4250-8dfe-18e06b579af1 (on file with the Columbia
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oil spills on fish resources and commercial fishing is expected to cause
less than a 1 percent decrease in standing stocks of any population, com-
mercial fishing efforts, landings, or value of those landings” and as a re-
sult the “expected level of impact” would be “negligible.”123 Agencies
have made similar arguments frequently in evaluating the climate change
implications of their decisions, such as when they have considered leases
for lands with fossil fuel resources whose extraction would result in the
release of millions of tons of carbon, but less than one percent of global
emissions.124 Most recently, advocates for extracting and transporting the
Canadian oil sands, which are one of the largest untapped sources of pe-
troleum—and carbon emissions—in North America, have argued that
“[i]t is important to recognize that the overall contribution of oil sands
production to global GHG emissions is less than 0.1 percent.”125 The
State Department used similar reasoning in a recent draft NEPA Environ-
mental Impact Statement on the pipeline and concluded that it will have
minimal impact.126
One percent arguments are also common in the legislative and regu-
latory advocacy of the agricultural sector. Advocates have acknowledged
that agriculture accounts for roughly 7% of U.S. carbon emissions, yet
they have argued that the large number of farms and other small sources
justifies exclusion from federal cap and trade legislation for the entire
sector.127 An example of an argument made for a subsection of the agri-
123. 1 Minerals Mgmt. Serv., supra note 4, at 2–17. R
124. See generally Madeline June Kass, A NEPA Climate Paradox: Taking Greenhouse
Gases into Account in Threshold Significance Determinations, 42 Ind. L. Rev. 47, 48–55
(2009) (noting importance of considering climate change in NEPA analyses); Amy L.
Stein, Climate Change Under NEPA: Avoiding Cursory Consideration of Greenhouse
Gases, 81 U. Colo. L. Rev. 473, 483–99 (2010) (describing agency consideration of climate
change impacts under NEPA).
125. America’s Energy Future: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Energy & Env’t of
the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 111th Cong. 4 (2010) (statement of James J.
Mulva, CEO, ConocoPhillips), available at http://republicans.energycommerce.house.
gov/Media/file/Hearings/Energy/2010-06-15_oil_ceos/Mulva%20Statement.pdf (on file
with the Columbia Law Review).
126. See Lynn Garner, Senators Ask Clinton for Thorough Review of Proposal for
Canadian Oil Sands Pipeline, 209 Daily Env’t Rep. (BNA), Nov. 1, 2010, at A-11 (reporting
on status of NEPA analysis of oil sands pipeline). Similar arguments have been made about
the relative size of the carbon emissions that should be subject to state versions of NEPA.
See, e.g., Jeffrey D. Dintzer & Margaret A. Farrand, Accounting for Climate Impacts Under
the California Environmental Quality Act, 1 Daily Env’t Rep. (BNA), Jan. 5, 2009, at B-1
(“In the context of greenhouse gas emissions, it is far from clear how to determine what is
‘significant,’ so as to require preparation of an Environmental Impact Report, given that
any given project contributes only a very small amount to the global problem.”).
127. See Megan Stubbs, Cong. Res. Serv., R41622, Environmental Regulation and
Agriculture 1 (2011) (noting that because “[a]ttempt[ ] to regulate numerous individual
crop and livestock operations can be cost prohibitive for government regulators[,] . . .
much of the current federal farm policy . . . is . . . voluntary,” not compulsory); Steven D.
Cook, Farm, Forestry Groups Say Climate Bill Should Not Regulate Those Sectors, 106
Daily Env’t Rep. (BNA), June 5, 2009, at A-8 (quoting Dennis Nuxoll of American
Farmland Trust for proposition that “so many small sources ‘does not warrant inclusion of
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cultural sector is the dairy industry’s promotion of the notion that the
dairy industry generates only 2% of all U.S. emissions.128 Similarly, in
2008 farmers in New York used a comparable argument to lobby against a
proposed GHG emissions regulation.129 Asserting that cows have a mini-
mal effect on climate change, a New York Farm Bureau spokesman
stated, “You could take all of our cows together and they probably
wouldn’t have the same effect on the atmosphere [as] the average traffic
jam on the Tappan Zee Bridge.”130 The Department of Agriculture raised
similar arguments in a public comment opposing the regulation.131
Advocates for other sectors have made similar arguments. The solid
waste sector has used a one percent argument as a basis for arguing that it
should not be subject to carbon regulations.132 The domestic general avi-
ation industry has used this approach in opposing GHG emissions re-
quirements. For instance, the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association
(AOPA) challenged EPA aviation regulations by arguing “[g]eneral avia-
tion is estimated to contribute less than one percent of all [U.S. green-
house gas] emissions.”133 In comments to the EPA, AOPA argued that
“imposing new regulations, equipment requirements, or operational
changes on general aviation would be difficult to justify since general avi-
ation is not a significant source of greenhouse gas emissions.”134 The
Regional Aviation News echoed this position by highlighting the adminis-
the whole agricultural sector within the category of covered sectors’” in the House cap and
trade legislation).
128. See Press Release, Innovation Ctr. for U.S. Dairy, Dairy Industry Completes Fluid
Milk Carbon Footprint Study as Part of Industrywide Sustainability Commitment (Sept. 22,
2010), available at http://www.usdairy.com/Newsroom/2010PressReleases/Pages/Dairy
industrycompletesfluidmilkcarbonfootprintstudy.aspx (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) (discussing carbon emissions of dairy industry).
129. See Kate Galbraith, Farmers Panic About a ‘Cow Tax,’ N.Y. Times Green Blog
(Dec. 1, 2008, 12:46 PM), http://greeninc.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/12/01/farmers-panic-
about-a-cow-tax (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (reporting on response of
agricultural sector to proposed carbon emissions regulations).
130. Id.
131. See Regulating Greenhouse Gas Emissions Under the Clean Air Act, 73 Fed. Reg.
44,354, 44,376 (proposed July 30, 2008) (providing Department of Agriculture comments
on EPA carbon regulatory options). Ironically, the DOA advocated an exemption based on
how many agricultural operations exceeded the statutory threshold: “Even very small
agricultural operations would meet a 100-tons-per-year emissions threshold. For example,
dairy facilities with over 25 cows, beef cattle operations of over 50 cattle, swine operations
with over 200 hogs, and farms with over 500 acres of corn” would be covered. Id. at 44,377.
132. See Greenhouse Gas Emissions: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Energy &
Env’t of the H. Comm. on Sci. & Tech., 111th Cong. 38 (Feb. 24, 2009) (statement of
Leslie Wong, Director, Greenhouse Gas Programs, Waste Management), available at http:/
/science.house.gov/sites/republicans.science.house.gov/files/documents/hearing/0224
09_Wong.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (“Overall, the waste sector is a very
small contributor to total U.S. GHG emissions—less than three percent.”).
133. Aircraft Owners & Pilots Ass’n, General Aviation and Greenhouse Gas Emission,
http://www.aopa.org/whatsnew/regulatory/regghg.html (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) (last visited Aug. 14, 2011).
134. Id.
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trative and cost burdens of such a regulatory scheme, “particularly if the
scheme is applied to small operators, such as business aviation and heli-
copters, which contribute less than one percent of aviation emissions.”135
The U.S. Chamber of Commerce has made one percent arguments
by advocating for de minimis exemptions for small emissions sources
(often small businesses). For example, in the GHG context, the Chamber
wrote a letter to EPA Administrator Lisa Jackson urging her to not regu-
late GHGs under the Clean Air Act.136 In the letter, the Chamber stated
that it was “particularly concerned with the prospect that EPA regulation
of GHGs under the CAA will lead to regulation of hundreds of thousands,
if not more than a million, small sources.”137
Use of one percent arguments is also common in legislative and reg-
ulatory debates outside the GHG area. For instance, in 2003 the
California State Senate considered repealing a measure that exempted all
pre-1974 cars from vehicle emissions testing.138 A leading automobile
website published a column opposing the bill, arguing that pre-1974 cars
make up less than 1% of total miles driven in California.139 Governor
Gray Davis eventually signed S.B. 708 into law,140 but the final version of
135. Special Report: Aviation and Climate Change—Part I, Regional Aviation News
(July 23, 2007), http://www.aviationtoday.com/ran/categories/commercial/14182.html
(on file with the Columbia Law Review) (stating “legislators and regulators should look at
the record of what aviation has already accomplished over the last 40 years before using the
industry as a scapegoat for their failure” to make tough regulatory decisions). As we noted
at the outset, the effect of administrative costs on the marginal costs of regulating one
percent sources is a genuine concern.
136. Letter from Am. Forest & Paper Ass’n et al., to Liza Perez Jackson, Adm’r, U.S.
Envtl Prot. Agency (Apr. 1, 2009) [hereinafter Multi-Industry Letter], available at http://
www.uschamber.com/issues/letters/2009/090401_caa.htm (on file with the Columbia Law
Review); see also Steven D. Cook, Senate Republicans Want More Information from
McCarthy on Small Source Emissions, 40 Daily Env’t Rep. (BNA), May 11, 2009, at A-9 (on
file with the Columbia Law Review) (describing senators’ efforts to raise concerns about EPA
regulation of small carbon emissions sources as “‘an incredibly cynical ploy . . . to block
solutions to the climate crisis and create a distraction from the real issues’” (quoting Kassie
Siegel, Dir. of the Ctr. for Biological Diversity’s Climate Law Inst.)).
137. Muti-Industry Letter, supra note 136, at 1. R
138. See Lesli A. Maxwell, High-Stakes Assault on Dirty Air: Dairies, Farms, Fireplaces
and Old Cars Would See Tougher Anti-Pollution Regulations, The Sacramento Bee, Mar.
1, 2003, at A3 (noting that S.B. 708 would only exempt cars at least forty-five years old).
139. According to Karl Brauer, the majority of those cars are restored classic cars that
are not driven for daily use, thus the one percent conclusion. Karl Brauer, Big Economies,
Small Minds, Edmunds.com (Mar. 20, 2003), http://www.edmunds.com/news/column/
carmudgeon/94938/article.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review). Thus, according
to Bauer, “emissions testing old cars is a wasted effort if California really wants to improve
its air quality.” Id.
140. Press Release, Cal. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Governor Davis Signs Landmark Air
Quality Legislation into Law (Sept. 22, 2003), reprinted in Cal. Envtl. Prot. Agency,
Enivronmental Accomplishments 1999–2003, at 535 (2003), avaliable at http://
www.calepa.ca.gov/Legislation/Archives/Complete99-03.pdf (on file with the Columbia
Law Review).
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the bill no longer affected the pre-1974 exemption and instead simply set
up a checkpoint system for “smoking vehicles.”141
One percent arguments also have been raised on numerous occa-
sions to defeat additional mercury controls on U.S. coal-fired electric gen-
erating plants.142 In 2004, the Chamber of Commerce commented in op-
position to regulating mercury emissions from U.S. power plants: “U.S.
power plant emissions contribute just one percent of the total global mer-
cury emissions into the atmosphere, [and] much of the mercury that is
deposited into lakes and rivers does not come from U.S. power plants.”143
The Chamber went on to argue that “reducing emissions of mercury
from U.S. power plants will have a minimal effect on lowering levels of
methyl mercury in freshwater fish. Thus there is no present justification
for a finding that it is necessary to regulate emissions of mercury from
U.S. power plants.”144
Presumably the assumption behind excluding one percent sources is
that the costs of regulating them exceed the benefits and that the prob-
lem can be addressed adequately without them. As the discussion above
suggests, however, advocates often do not feel compelled to make these
arguments explicit. The size of a source’s contribution seems to suffice in
many cases, and in the climate policy arena advocates are free to select a
denominator that will frame their contribution in one percent terms. So
long as advocates can easily frame the contributions of emissions sources
and source categories to make one percent arguments, these arguments
can be expected to proliferate and to contribute to the one percent prob-
lem for climate change policy.
III. A CARBON DISCLOSURE REGIME FOR LEGISLATION
One percent arguments rely on framing the issue in individual
terms—focusing on the contribution of an individual source or sector
relative to the whole—as opposed to framing it in terms of the aggregate
141. Id.; see also John Ellis, City Officials Address Budget, Valley Air Issues Council
Lends Its Support to a Package of Bills Aimed at Cleaning Up San Joaquin Valley Air, The
Fresno Bee, May 21, 2003, at B1 (reporting on responses to air emissions requirements).
142. See, e.g., Clear Skies Act of 2003: Hearing on S. 485 Before the Subcomm. on
Clean Air, Climate Change, & Nuclear Safety of the S. Comm. on Env’t & Pub. Works,
108th Cong. 372–73 (2003) (statement of Wes Taylor, President of Production, TXU
Energy North America) (arguing against new mercury emissions controls on coal-fired
electric generating plants by asserting, “the mercury emission controls would not
significantly reduce global loading of mercury—the Environmental Protection Agency has
stated that U.S. electric generators comprise less than one percent of the global mercury
emissions”).
143. William L. Kovacs, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Comments on EPA’s Proposed
Rule: Proposed National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants; and, in the
Alternative, Proposed Standards of Performance for New and Existing Stationary Sources:
Electric Utility Steam Generating Units 16–17 (2004), available at http://www.uschamber.
com/sites/default/files/comments/commentsepaproposedruleonmercury.pdf (on file
with the Columbia Law Review).
144. Id. at 17.
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effects of individual contributions. As the previous Part demonstrates,
these one percent arguments have been made with regard to carbon
emissions reductions, even though emissions targets cannot reasonably
be expected to be achieved without reductions from many one percent
sources. To confront one percent arguments, it is critical to change the
frame of reference from a focus on exemptions justified individually to a
focus on aggregate effects. In the next two Parts we defend a policy tai-
lored to shift the domestic frame of reference from one percent argu-
ments to an aggregate accounting and, at the same time, to address an
enormous gap in climate change policy.
In this Part, we defend requiring disclosure of the carbon emissions
consequences of proposed and enacted federal legislation. Similar disclo-
sure rules currently require Congress to calculate the financial cost to the
federal government (and state and local governments) from bills and en-
acted legislation. Estimating the emissions costs of legislation would help
Congress—perhaps the most important forum for long-term changes in
the U.S. carbon emissions growth curve—assess aggregate carbon emis-
sions, debate, set priorities, and make year-over-year comparisons. Pub-
licly available estimates of the carbon emissions of any one piece of legis-
lation and of aggregate emissions from legislative activity will enable a
more robust climate mitigation debate and will make it more difficult for
advocates to frame issues in ways that lead to the one percent problem. If
an advocate for any one source or source category advances a one per-
cent argument, others can assess the merits of the argument against the
backdrop of the emissions associated with the particular legislative action
and of all legislative activity. Disclosure has much to recommend it as a
stand-alone change; it is also a necessary step toward legislative carbon
budgeting, which we propose in the next Part. Whereas disclosure facili-
tates priority setting, budgeting would require individual decisions to be
evaluated in relation to the whole.
A. The Current Carbon Disclosure Regime
To appreciate the need for a federal legislative carbon disclosure re-
gime, it makes sense to begin with a brief snapshot of the current federal
approach to carbon disclosure. Though information disclosure has been
an important element of environmental regulation for many years,145
145. See, e.g., National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190,
§ 102(2)(c), 83 Stat. 852, 853 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2006))
(requiring that federal agencies produce environmental impact statements prior to
undertaking major federal actions); Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know
Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. § 11023 (requiring covered industrial sectors to file annual reports
of disclosures of more than 650 listed toxic substances to create the Toxics Release
Inventory). See generally Bradley C. Karkkainen, Toward a Smarter NEPA: Monitoring and
Managing Government’s Environmental Performance, 102 Colum. L. Rev. 903, 955–67
(2002) (providing assessment of role of information disclosure in environmental law and
according reform of NEPA).
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prior to 2009 most disclosure of carbon emissions was voluntary and oc-
curred at the state, regional, or corporate level.146 Three developments
since 2009 have shifted the emissions disclosure landscape dramatically.
These changes highlight the significant momentum toward a more com-
prehensive disclosure regime and make all the more stark the absence of
an emissions accounting scheme as applied to Congress’s lawmaking.
First, in 2009, the EPA adopted its first mandatory carbon disclosure
regulation, requiring disclosure of the annual carbon emissions from a
broad range of industrial and other entities.147 The EPA estimates that
the disclosure rule will require disclosure of approximately 85% of U.S.
emissions.148
Second, also in 2009, President Obama issued an executive order
that requires federal agencies to create agency-wide targets for reductions
in emissions by 2020 relative to a 2008 baseline.149 Based on targeting
reports by federal agencies, President Obama announced that the federal
government would reduce its direct emissions by 28% by 2020.150 The
executive order requires each agency to report annually to the Director
of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) summarizing its pro-
gress in achieving the emissions reduction targets it has established,151
and to report annually a “comprehensive inventory” of its direct and indi-
rect emissions.152 This executive order does not, however, require agen-
146. See Mandatory Reporting of Greenhouse Gases, 74 Fed. Reg. 16,448, 16,457–61
(proposed Oct. 30, 2009) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 40 C.F.R.)
(providing concise summary of existing federal, state, and regional emissions reporting
programs); Stein, supra note 124, at 483–99 (describing agency disclosure of climate R
change impacts under NEPA); Carbon Disclosure Project, https://www.cdproject.net/en-
US/Pages/HomePage.aspx (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (last visited Aug. 14,
2011) (providing usable inventory of corporate emissions disclosures in absence of
mandatory reporting requirements).
147. See Mandatory Reporting of Greenhouse Gases, 74 Fed. Reg. at 52,260
(requiring disclosure of carbon dioxide equivalents).
148. Id. at 56,272.
149. See Federal Leadership in Environmental, Energy, and Economic Performance,
Exec. Order No. 13,514, § 2(a)–(b), 3 C.F.R 248, 249–50 (2010).
150. See Press Release, White House Press Office, President Obama Sets Greenhouse
Gas Emissions Reductions Targets for Federal Operations (Jan. 29, 2010), available
at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/president-obama-sets-greenhouse-gas-emis
sions-reduction-target-federal-operations (on file with the Columbia Law Review). The
President also has directed agencies to reduce indirect emissions by 13% by 2020. Press
Release, White House Press Office, President Obama Expands Greenhouse Gas Reduction
Target for Federal Operations (July 20, 2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
the-press-office/president-obama-expands-greenhouse-gas-reduction-target-federal-opera
tions (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
151. Exec. Order No. 13,514, § 8, 3 C.F.R. at 255.
152. To assist this effort, the Executive Order requires the Council on Environmental
Quality (CEQ), an executive office agency, in consultation with other agencies to issue
guidelines on greenhouse gas accounting and reporting. The CEQ issued Federal
Greenhouse Gas Accounting and Reporting Guidance (Oct. 6, 2010) [hereinafter CEQ
Accounting Guidance], available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/
microsites/ceq/ghg_guidance_document_0.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review), as
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cies to calculate the carbon implications of their own regulations.153 (We
address the extension of carbon disclosure and budgeting rules to agency
regulations below.)154
Third, at the same time that federal agencies were establishing the
emissions reduction targets required by President Obama’s executive or-
der, the Council on Environmental Quality issued draft guidance on how
federal agencies can improve their evaluation of GHGs under the
National Environmental Policy Act,155 the centerpiece of federal disclo-
sure requirements for federal government projects and the grandfather
of environmental disclosure regimes.156 This draft guidance proposes
that when a federal agency anticipates that its actions will cause direct
emissions of 25,000 metric tons or more of GHG annually, the same
threshold that applies under the EPA’s mandatory disclosure rule, the
agency “should consider this an indicator that a quantitative and qualita-
tive assessment may be meaningful to decision makers and the public.”157
These recent developments represent an important shift in the scope
and architecture of the federal disclosure regime applicable to carbon.
The new measures avoid the most extreme aspects of the one percent
problem by focusing disclosure on emissions, rather than on the impact
of emissions. As CEQ makes clear in its guidance for applying NEPA, esti-
mated levels of GHG emissions “can serve as a reasonable proxy for assess-
ing potential climate change impacts.”158 This has several advantages.
Emissions are more easily estimated than the marginal environmental im-
pact of those emissions. Estimating emissions is also less dependent upon
the current state of climate science than is analyzing their impact. Fur-
ther, these new disclosure requirements facilitate year-over-year compari-
well as an accompanying Technical Support Document Federal Greenhouse Gas
Accounting and Reporting Guidance (Oct. 6, 2010) [hereinafter Technical Support],
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ceq/technical_
support_document_1.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review). That Guidance
specifically declines to establish de minimis reporting thresholds below which reporting is
not required. See CEQ Accounting Guidance, supra, at 16. Rather the agency is to use the
methodologies in the Technical Support Document to address small or trace emissions.
Technical Support, supra, at 1.
153. See Exec. Order No. 13,514, § 8, 3 C.F.R. at 255 (requiring agencies to prepare
annual Strategic Sustainability Performance Plans for review by CEQ and OMB, but not
requiring assessment of carbon impacts of regulations themselves).
154. See infra notes 228–233, 264 and accompanying text. R
155. Memorandum from Nancy H. Sutley, Council on Envtl. Quality, to Heads of
Federal Departments and Agencies, Draft NEPA Guidance on Consideration of the Effects
of Climate Change and Greenhouse Gas Emissions (Feb. 18, 2010), http://ceq.hss.doe.
gov/nepa/regs/Consideration_of_Effects_of_GHG_Draft_NEPA_Guidance_FINAL_0218
2010.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter, Sutley Memorandum].
156. Karkkainen, supra note 145, at 904–05. R
157. Sutley Memorandum, supra note 155, at 1. R
158. Id. at 3; see also Stein, supra note 124, at 483–99 (discussing how agencies R
disclose climate change impacts under NEPA).
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son of emissions.159 These relative comparisons frame emissions informa-
tion in ways that that can help to address the one percent problem. For
example, year-over-year emissions disclosures provide the information
necessary to focus the policy debate on how each source can improve as
opposed to the contribution of any one source as compared to all others.
Studies show that individuals treat relative comparisons of small values as
more meaningful than absolute values, for which they typically have little
basis for judgment.160 These new disclosure rules also mandate disclo-
sures from more sources than previously required.
Though important advances, these developments also make all the
more plain an enormous gap in our carbon disclosure regime. While car-
bon disclosure now applies to federal agencies, significant federal actions,
and nearly 85% of private sources of emissions, no carbon disclosure re-
quirements currently apply to the institution whose structural decisions
most significantly affect the long-term emissions of the country: Congress.
Without any disclosure regime that attaches to federal legislation and ap-
propriations, the emissions impact of legislation is not part of most legis-
lative debates.
The result is not only the omission from legislative debate of, but
also the creation of a misleading impression concerning, the carbon con-
sequences of federal legislation. Consider, for instance, the 2009 Ameri-
can Reinvestment and Recovery Act (ARRA), the stimulus bill, which in-
cluded $787 billion in stimulus spending. The ARRA included important
new provisions promoting weatherization, energy efficiency, rail trans-
port, and other requirements that will likely reduce carbon emissions by
millions of tons over the short and long term.161 The ARRA allocated the
lion’s share of the $787 billion (approximately 90%, or $700 billion),
however, to economic stimulus spending that was not designed to reduce
carbon emissions, and only a small share (approximately 10%, or $70 bil-
lion) was reserved for clean energy and other projects likely to reduce
carbon emissions.162 From the perspective of carbon emissions, two im-
159. Sutley Memorandum, supra note 155, at 3; see also Karkkainen, supra note 145, R
at 956–57 (praising Toxics Release Inventory (TRI) for providing reports on pollutants
released, facilitating benchmarking).
160. See Stone et al., supra note 48, at 403 (showing subjects treat relative risks R
comparisons, such as “twice as safe,” as more meaningful than risk stated in absolute
terms); see also Colin Camerer & Howard Kunreuther, Decision Processes for Low
Probability Events: Policy Implications, 8 J. Pol’y Analysis & Mgmt. 565, 570 (1989)
(showing same effect); Diane F. Halpern, Sonia Blackman & Billis Salzman, Using
Statistical Risk Information to Assess Oral Contraceptive Safety, 3 Applied Cognitive
Psychol. 251, 256 (1989) (showing same effect).
161. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat.
115 (to be codified in scattered titles of U.S.C.) .
162. See Farhana Hossain, Amanda Cox, John McGrath & Stephan Weitberg, The
Stimulus Plan: How to Spend $787 Billion, N.Y. Times, http://projects.nytimes.com/
44th_president/stimulus (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (last visited Nov. 7, 2011)
(identifying ARRA projects); see also Where the US Stimulus Money is Going, 461 Nature
856, 856–57 (2009) (noting allocation of stimulus funds for research).
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portant features of the bill are its effects on increasing overall economic
activity and its promotion of new infrastructure with long-term carbon
implications. The funded infrastructure included not only railroads and
local mass transit, which are likely to reduce emissions as compared to
many alternatives, but also roads and other projects likely to increase
long-term carbon emissions. Although only very general analysis is possi-
ble with the limited information available, the general stimulus, road-
building, and other provisions may yield carbon emissions that swamp the
reductions from the Act’s efficiency-related provisions.163
Calculating the effects of government economic stimulus on GDP is
difficult, but even a very rough estimate provides a sense of the impor-
tance of legislative carbon disclosure and budgeting. If we assume that
the ARRA was responsible for a 1.5 to 4.2% increase in GDP for the first
year (or roughly $213 billion to $596 billion in GDP growth),164 and if we
assume that the economy-wide ratio in 2008 of .48 kilograms of CO2 per
dollar of U.S. GDP growth remained constant,165 this effect of the bill
163. In an implicit recognition of the important nexus between economic activity and
carbon emissions, Congress has asked the National Academy of Sciences to conduct a
carbon audit of the tax code. See Energy Improvement and Extension Act of 2008, Pub. L.
No. 110-343, § 117(a), 122 Stat. 3807, 3831 (“[T]he National Academy of Sciences [shall]
undertake a comprehensive review of . . . specific tax provisions that have the largest effects
on carbon and other greenhouse gas emissions . . . .”); see also Consolidated
Appropriations Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-117, 123 Stat. 3034 (to be codified in scattered
titles of U.S.C.) (appropriating $1.5 million to conduct audit).
164. The Congressional Budget Office’s report in third quarter of 2010 estimated that
the ARRA increased GDP by 1.5–4.2%. Cong. Budget Office, Estimated Impact of the
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act on Employment and Economic Output from
April 2010 Through June 2010, at 3 tbl.1 (2010) [hereinafter Cong. Budget Office,
Estimated Impact], available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/117xx/doc11706/08-24-
ARRA.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review). We note that there is substantial
uncertainty about the multiplier by which GDP increases when the government spends a
dollar. Some models suggest that it is zero (all government spending is wasteful because
monetary policy stabilizes the economy), others that it is one (suggesting that stimulus
spending simply shifts GDP from the future to now), and yet others that it is infinity (fiscal
stimulus saves us from a financial meltdown). See Russell Hall, How Much Does GDP Rise
if the Government Buys More Output? 3–6 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 15496, 2009), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w15496 (on file with
the Columbia Law Review) (describing different models for multiplier by which GDP
increases). We also note the problem that the numbers available through the International
Energy Agency are average numbers, whereas the stimulus results in a marginal change.
The marginal change is likely to be different from the average, and there also is a broader
question regarding whether the ARRA-induced GDP growth is long-term. We are only
trying to provide a very rough sense of the impact of the bill, however, and our estimates
are valuable even if they are off by an order of magnitude.
165. See Int’l Energy Agency, IEA Statistics: CO2 Emissions from Fuel Combustion 89
(2010), available at http://www.iea.org/co2highlights/CO2highlights.pdf (on file with the
Columbia Law Review). These assumptions are necessary in part because there was
substantial opposition to calculating the environmental impacts of projects funded by the
ARRA, at least ostensibly because the assessment process would delay spending. See Conn
Carroll, NEPA: Yet Another Reason the Stimulus Is Guaranteed to Fail, The Foundry (Feb.
5, 2009, 4:03 PM), http://blog.heritage.org/2009/02/05/nepa-yet-another-reason-the-
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alone would have added 101 million to 284 million metric tons of CO2 to
the atmosphere in the first year. The CO2 emissions avoided by the
weatherization and other energy-related provisions would have to be re-
markably large to offset these estimated increases.166 In sum, although
the stimulus bill was promoted as having, and had, many carbon-friendly
provisions,167 largely absent from the debate was the massive net increase
in carbon emissions that may have been caused by the bill. Only an analy-
sis of the net carbon emissions of the entire statute would have provided
policymakers with an understanding of whether the legislation was consis-
tent not only with economic goals but also with the environmental goal
articulated by President Obama of reducing national carbon emissions by
17% by 2020.168 Such a carbon analysis would prompt the unavoidable
stimulus-is-guaranteed-to-fail (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (discussing impact of
NEPA delays on stimulus implementation). ARRA activities must clear NEPA review,
§ 1609, but provisions are in place to ensure the expeditious completion of NEPA reviews,
§ 1609(b).
166. For example, even if the ARRA target number of 600,000 homes were
weatherized, see Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Secretary Chu Announces Major New
Recovery Act Milestone: 300,000 Homes Weatherized (Jan. 19, 2011), available at http://
energy.gov/articles/secretary - chu -announces -major-new-recovery-act-milestone-300000-
homes-weatherized (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (noting that by January 2011
half of 600,000 home target had been achieved), and if weatherization reduced home
energy consumption by 10%, a figure suggested for weatherization by leading experts, see
Gerald T. Gardner & Paul C. Stern, Environmental Problems and Human Behavior 259
tbl.10-3 (2d ed. 2002), and household CO2 emissions are no more than 50 metric tons per
year, see Vandenbergh & Steinemann, Carbon-Neutral, supra note 17, at 1691–94 R
(estimating total emissions per individual to be over 7 tons per year and 2.59 individuals
per household, for total of over 18 tons of CO2 emissions per household per year), then
full implementation of the stimulus weatherization funds could be expected to generate
annual emissions reductions of no more than 3 million metric tons (10% x 50 tons per
year x 600,000 homes = 3 million tons per year), a figure that is a fraction of our estimate
of 102–284 million tons of GDP-related increases in emissions. The GDP calculations draw
on the Bureau of Economic Analysis’s 2008 fourth quarter dollar amount for GDP, which
is $14,081.7 billion. See Bureau of Econ. Analysis, U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Current-Dollar
and “Real” GDP, http://www.bea.gov/national/xls/gdplev.xls (on file with the Columbia
Law Review) (last updated Aug. 26, 2011). We used the fourth quarter of 2008 because
Table 1 of the CBO report estimates the macroeconomic effect of ARRA in the first
quarter of 2009, suggesting that the last quarter of 2008 is a better pre-stimulus baseline.
See Cong. Budget Office, Estimated Impact, supra note 164, at 3 tbl.1. The totals were R
calculated as follows: .015 x 14,081.7 billion x .00048 tons of carbon dioxide (= 101 million
tons of CO2) and .042 x 14,081.7 billion x .00048 tons of carbon dioxide (= 284 million
tons of CO2).
167. See Sins of Emission, Economist, Mar. 14, 2009, at 26, (“The administration has
dedicated roughly a tenth of the $787 billion to be spent under the stimulus bill to energy
and the environment . . . includ[ing] $33 billion to green the country’s electricity supply,
$27 billion for energy efficiency and $19 billion for cleaner forms of transport.”).
168. See Press Release, White House Press Office, President to Attend Copenhagen
Climate Talks (Nov. 25, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/
president-attend-copenhagen-climate-talks (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (“[T]he
President is prepared to put on the table a U.S. emissions reduction target in the range of
17% below 2005 levels in 2020.”). See generally Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Creating the
Clean Energy of Tomorrow and Protecting the Environment and Natural Resources, The
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but as yet largely postponed national debate over the tension between
economic growth goals and carbon emissions reduction targets.
B. Legislation and Disclosure
Because federal legislation is so important to our long-term emis-
sions strategy, Congress’s legislative choices should not be made without
consideration of their carbon emissions consequences. The character of
the collective action problem created by the climate problem also recom-
mends that all proposed and enacted legislation be subject to carbon
disclosure.
The suggestion that proposed and enacted legislation should be ac-
companied by estimates of its carbon emissions impact might initially
sound adventurous. Information disclosure and analysis rules, however,
have a well-established and growing place in the legislative process. As we
explain below, estimates of carbon emissions would not only respond to
the same type of information deficits and collective action problems that
motivated existing legislative disclosure requirements, but could also em-
ploy a similar design.
1. Congress’s Self-Imposed Fiscal Disclosure Requirements. — Numerous
disclosure and analysis requirements currently apply to congressional
committee reports and legislation. In the House of Representatives, for
instance, a committee report must contain estimates of the cost to the
federal government of the legislation,169 an estimate of the unfunded
costs to nonfederal entities,170 a statement of the constitutional authority
for the bill,171 and a preemption statement.172 Senate rules require, in
addition, that committee reports accompanying bills contain an evalua-
tion of the regulatory impact of the bill, including its effects on individu-
als and businesses, its impact on privacy, and the additional paperwork it
requires.173
By far the oldest and most cross-cutting legislative disclosure require-
ments relate to the budget and financial consequences of legislation.174
For our purposes, it is useful to focus on two of the most influential
budget-related disclosure rules. First, as part of the near-total reform of
Federal Budget, Fiscal Year 2012, http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/factsheet/creating-
the-clean-energy-of-tomorrow (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (last visited Aug. 14,
2012) (describing Administration’s energy and environmental policy).
169. Rules of the House of Representatives, Rule XIII, cl. 3(c)–(d), 112th Cong.
(2011) [hereinafter House Rules], available at http://rules.house.gov/Media/file/PDF_
112_1/legislativetext/112th%20Rules%20Pamphlet.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law
Review).
170. 2 U.S.C. § 658b(c)–(d) (2006).
171. House Rules, supra note 169, Rule XII, cl. 7(c). R
172. 2 U.S.C. § 658b(e).
173. Standing Rules of the Senate, S. Doc. No. 110-9, Rule XXVI, cl. 11(b)(1) (2007).
174. See Garrett & Vermeule, supra note 23, at 1307 (“The most influential and R
ubiquitous procedural framework designed to produce and structure information is the
congressional budget process.”).
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the federal budgeting process in the Congressional Budget and
Impoundment Control Act of 1974,175 Congress created the Congres-
sional Budget Office and required the CBO to calculate the costs in-
curred over a four-year period by each bill or joint resolution reported by
any committee of the House or Senate.176 Whenever feasible, these bill-
by-bill estimates are to be included in the committee reports accompany-
ing the proposed legislation.177 The Act also requires the CBO to provide
an annual report to Congress of its fiscal policy, including the budget
consequences of newly enacted legislation.178 The point of these disclo-
sure requirements was to furnish Congress with detailed information con-
cerning the budget consequences of proposed legislation so that its
budget consequences form part of the legislative debate, and to provide
an external measure of the budget consequences of enacted legislation.
In the 1990s, a second reform resulted from concerns raised by state
and local officials that federal legislation was regularly imposing require-
ments on state and local governments without appropriating funds to pay
for implementing these requirements—so-called unfunded federal man-
dates.179 By enacting unfunded federal mandates, federal lawmakers
could claim credit for popular new programs without having to pay for
them from the federal fisc or through unpopular tax increases.180 In re-
sponse to these concerns, Congress enacted the Unfunded Mandates
Reform Act of 1995 (UMRA).181 The mechanics of UMRA are similar to
the budget disclosure requirement of the 1974 Budget Act: When pro-
posed legislation includes any federal mandate, UMRA requires the au-
thorizing congressional committee to submit the bill to the Congressional
Budget Office and identify the mandate.182 A statement by the CBO esti-
mating the direct cost of the mandate must be included in the commit-
175. Pub. L. No. 93-344, 88 Stat. 297 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 601–688).
176. See id. § 403, 88 Stat. at 320 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 653(1)). CBO
prepares hundreds of these cost estimates a year. See Cong. Budget Office, Cost Estimates
for the 111th Congress, http://www.cbo.gov/CEBrowse.cfm (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) (last visited Aug. 14, 2011) (listing current estimates for various bills).
177. 2 U.S.C. § 653. These requirements also are now incorporated in congressional
rules. See, e.g., House Rules, supra note 169, Rule X, cl. 4(f) (requiring submission of R
“estimates with respect to all matters to be set forth in the concurrent resolution”).
178. 2 U.S.C. § 602(e). For an example of such a report, see generally Cong. Budget
Office, Pub. No. 4156, The Budget and Economic Outlook: An Update (2010) (providing
annual report to Congress).
179. See John Dinan, Strengthening the Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Fate
of Recent Federalism Legislation in the U.S. Congress, Publius, Summer 2004, at 55, 56–57
(describing concerted efforts by major state and local government organizations to end
unfunded mandates).
180. See Elizabeth Garrett, Framework Legislation and Federalism, 83 Notre Dame L.
Rev. 1495, 1514 (2008) [hereinafter Garrett, Framework Legislation] (describing
incentives of legislators to support unfunded mandates); Anita S. Krishnakumar,
Representation Reinforcement: A Legislative Solution to a Legislative Process Problem, 46
Harv. J. on Legis. 1, 17 (2009) (same).
181. Pub. L. No. 104-4, 109 Stat. 48 (codified at 2 U.S.C. §§ 658–658g, 1501–1571).
182. 2 U.S.C. § 658b(b).
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tee’s report on the bill.183 Any bill that does not include a statement,184
or that includes unfunded mandates over an inflation-adjusted threshold
of expenses in any given year for the next four, is subject to a point of
order.185 The goals of UMRA are also similar to those of the 1974 Budget
Act’s simple disclosure rule: to create better information about the costs
of unfunded mandates in the legislative process and to raise the political
costs to Congress of imposing these mandates.186
Although the UMRA has its limitations, including the fact that it
does not apply to duties imposed on states as a condition of receiving
federal assistance,187 it is generally credited with influencing congres-
sional deliberation and legislative choices.188 Because proponents of leg-
islation generally seek to avoid triggering unfunded mandate issues
under UMRA, UMRA may exert its most important influence on legisla-
tion at the drafting stage, “forc[ing] lawmakers and their staffs to con-
sider . . . the impact that proposed bills would have on state and local
governments.”189 Congress infrequently enacts legislation that exceeds
the statutory thresholds of UMRA. Between 1996 and 2005, of the 5,769
bills that the CBO reviewed, it identified sixty-four that contained un-
funded mandates that exceeded the cost threshold; five of those were
enacted.190 Between 2005 and 2010, Congress enacted an average of
fewer than three laws per year that exceeded the statutory threshold.191
Although these figures do not provide an assessment of the total financial
183. Id. § 658b(a), (c)–(d), (f) (requiring committee to include and publish CBO’s
report); id. § 658c(a)–(b) (requiring CBO to prepare report).
184. Id. § 658d(a)(1).
185. Id. § 658d(a)(2). The 2010 yearly threshold, adjusted for inflation, was $70
million for intergovernment mandates. Cong. Budget Office, Pub. No. 4255, A Review of
CBO’s Activities in 2010 Under the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act 1 (2011) [hereinafter
Cong. Budget Office, Activities in 2010].
186. See 141 Cong. Rec. 7749, 7749 (1995) (statement of Sen. John Glenn) (“[O]ne
of the major objectives of [UMRA] is to develop better information and data on the cost of
mandates and to force that to be considered up front.”); see also Garrett, Framework
Legislation, supra note 180, at 1500 (noting same goal). R
187. 2 U.S.C. § 658(7)(A)(i). See generally U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-05-
454, Unfunded Mandates: Views Vary About Act’s Strengths, Weaknesses, and Options for
Improvement (2005) (providing relatively comprehensive assessment of UMRA’s strengths
and weaknesses).
188. See Garrett, Framework Legislation, supra note 180, at 1505 (arguing UMRA has R
affected substance of legislation and dynamics of legislative process); Krishnakumar, supra
note 180, at 19–20 (crediting UMRA based on CBO studies with influencing congressional R
behavior and decreasing number of bills with unfunded mandates above statutory
threshold).
189. Krishnakumar, supra note 180, at 20–21 (recounting anecdotal evidence of R
success); see also Garrett, Framework Legislation, supra note 180, at 1505–06  (“‘[UMRA] R
has changed the way that prospective legislation is drafted . . . . Anytime there is a markup,
this always comes up.’” (quoting then-H. Rules Comm. Chairman Gerald Solomon)).
190. Cong. Budget Office, A Review of CBO’s Activities Under the Unfunded
Mandates Reform Act, 1996 to 2005, at 4–5 (2006).
191. Cong. Budget Office, Activities in 2010, supra note 185, at 5. Two such laws were R
enacted in 2006, three in 2007, one in 2008, none in 2009, and seven in 2010. Id.
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effects of mandates that fall below the statutory threshold,192 and al-
though the 1974 Budget Act’s mandate for cost estimates for bills has not
single-handedly contained the federal deficit, these two Acts’ disclosure
requirements at least provide information so that Congress and the pub-
lic can have a independent basis on which to debate the costs of legisla-
tion. In addition, the credibility of CBO cost estimates can alter the dy-
namics of the legislative process.193 Lawmakers may more easily discount
cost studies generated by interest groups as the product of self-interest or
bias.194 As a result, CBO cost estimates can arm interest groups with data
from a credible, independent source.195
2. Carbon Disclosure Rule for Congress — Legislation has not only
budget implications, but also carbon emissions implications. The basic
idea of a legislative disclosure requirement is that the carbon emissions
consequences of proposed legislation should be considered, just as
budget consequences are, during the legislative process.
A legislative carbon emissions disclosure requirement could adopt
the same basic structure as the congressional budget disclosure rules.
Specifically, a unit of the Congressional Budget Office could provide esti-
mates of the carbon consequences of legislation to be included in com-
mittee reports on the proposed legislation.196 It could also require the
CBO to produce an annual report calculating the carbon emissions im-
pact of newly enacted legislation. Like UMRA, the disclosure regime
could require that any bill considered on the floor include estimates of
the bill’s carbon consequences, and enforce this requirement through a
point of order, waivable by a majority vote. This enforcement structure
has proved critical for UMRA.197 These requirements could be imple-
mented through legislation or first adopted in House or Senate Rules.198
192. See Garrett, Framework Legislation, supra note 180, at 1511 (noting CBO does R
not assess cumulative impact of unfunded mandates below statutory threshold).
193. See Elizabeth Garrett, Enhancing the Political Safeguards of Federalism? The
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, 45 U. Kan. L. Rev. 1113, 1148–50 (1997)
[hereinafter Garrett, Enhancing] (discussing national policymakers’ perception of CBO
cost estimates as credible and disinterested).
194. See id. at 1148 (“Studies produced by the intergovernmental lobby on the costs
of unfunded mandates have been discounted as the product of self-interested parties who
are seeking to promote their own agenda.”).
195. Id. at 1150 (“CBO’s estimates will be well regarded because of its reputation, and
those representing states’ interests before national lawmakers may find their arguments
given more weight when they can rely on this information.”).
196. Alternatively, the carbon calculation function could be vested in a freestanding
agency. The critical point, as noted below, is that the agency with this responsibility should
have, or have the capacity to develop, the credibility of CBO. Indeed, CBO’s credibility
recommends reposing this responsibility in it.
197. See Garrett & Vermeule, supra note 23, at 1312 (noting that prior to UMRA, R
with its enforcement structure, Congress frequently ignored other requirement to produce
fiscal notes on cost imposed on states and local governments).
198. Both the House and Senate currently have rules that require disclosure of the
budget consequences of proposed legislation. See S. Con. Res. 21, 110th Cong. § 201
(enacted) (2007) (adopting Senate pay-as-you-go point of order); H.R. Res. 6, 110th Cong.
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This disclosure regime has several motivations. First, carbon emis-
sions are currently not even calculated by any authoritative source within
the legislative process. Second, as illustrated by the stimulus bill,199 with-
out such disclosure the carbon emissions consequences of legislation are
frequently misunderstood. Although disclosure would not guarantee that
legislators would consider the carbon emission costs of legislation, it
would at least facilitate them doing so, either on their own initiative or in
response to lobbying from interest groups using this information.200
The parallels between a carbon disclosure rule and unfunded man-
dates are close. In both cases, classic problems of collective action and
public choice give legislators incentives either to shift costs to the states,
in the case of unfunded mandates, or not to account for them at all, in
the case of carbon emissions. As with unfunded mandates, a disclosure
rule for carbon emissions would function as a precommitment strategy of
a minimally invasive kind: It would effectively force the individual mem-
bers and the institution to consider and to at least implicitly endorse or
reject the carbon emissions of legislation. Moreover, as with federal un-
funded mandates, simply requiring that these estimates be produced by
the CBO, an office with credibility across party lines, and upon which
Congress relies for budget estimates, could have an important effect on
the dynamics of the legislative process. A credible set of estimates would
improve the quality of the debate within Congress and the lobbying of
Congress by providing a single set of data for all to consider. More gener-
ally, this approach would more closely align Congress’s own carbon dis-
closure obligations with those of the federal agencies and much of private
industry.
With regard to technical feasibility, too, budget cost estimates and
carbon estimates are comparable in many respects. Although we have had
a longer national experience with budget estimates, carbon emissions cal-
culations have become far more sophisticated in recent years. To be sure,
carbon emissions estimates involve a level of judgment, including making
projections about future economic cycles and growth, selecting appropri-
ate benchmarks when specific data are unavailable, and having a willing-
ness to stop the analysis if additional precision provides sharply diminish-
ing returns.201 But in response to the recent tide of disclosure
requirements for private industry and the federal government, firms and
governments are already making these types of calculations. Under the
§ 405 (enacted) (2007) (adopting House pay-as-you-go point of order). House and Senate
Rules could also be the source of a carbon disclosure requirement. As an interim measure,
these carbon cost-of-legislation estimates could be produced by a private organization such
as those established to monitor government action.
199. See supra text accompanying notes 161–168 (discussing how stimulus bill relates R
to environmental regulation).
200. Garrett, Enhancing, supra note 193, at 1164. R
201. See, e.g., Michael P. Vandenbergh & Mark A. Cohen, Climate Change
Governance: Boundaries and Leakage, 18 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 221, 282 (2010) (discussing use
of benchmarks to calculate carbon emissions in corporate supply chains).
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United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, the EPA al-
ready generates an annual report of the total carbon emissions from the
United States as a whole.202 In addition, as noted above, federal law now
requires all federal agencies to estimate their carbon emissions through
2020,203 requires significant federal agency projects to include estimates
of their carbon emissions,204 and requires large industrial facilities in the
United States to disclose emissions.205 Several states have adopted carbon
emissions disclosure requirements for government and private emis-
sions.206 A large portion of the largest firms in the world also produce
detailed annual reports of their emissions under the voluntary Carbon
Disclosure Project guidelines.207
To facilitate these disclosure estimates several broadly used carbon
registries have developed sophisticated estimation protocols.208 The EPA
has also provided extensive technical guidance to the regulated commu-
nity on how to make the calculations for annual facility emissions report-
ing.209 Similarly, the CEQ has provided draft guidance to agencies on
how to fulfill their reporting obligations.210
202. See generally EPA, Inventory, supra note 14. R
203. Federal Leadership in Environmental, Energy, and Economic Performance,
Exec. Order No. 13,514, § 2, 3 C.F.R 248, 249 (2010).
204. Sutley Memorandum, supra note 155, at 2. R
205. Mandatory Reporting of Greenhouse Gases, 74 Fed. Reg. 56,260, 56,272 (Oct.
30, 2009) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 40 C.F.R.); see also Carbon
Disclosure Project, https://www.cdproject.net/en-US/Pages/HomePage.aspx (on file with
the Columbia Law Review) (last visited Oct. 16, 2011) (reporting organizations’ disclosures).
206. See, e.g., The Global Warming Solutions Act, 2006 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 488 (A.B.
32) (West) (requiring reporting of greenhouse gas emissions from California emissions
sources); Cal. Code Regs. tit. 17, §§ 95100–95133 (2010) (requiring reporting and
verification of state greenhouse gas emissions); 310 Mass. Code Regs. § 7.71 (2010)
(same); N.H. Code R. Env-A 900 (Lexis Nexis 2010) (requiring same of owners and
operators of emissions sources); Nw. States in Action, Climate Solutions, http://climate
solutions.org/nw-states/?searchterm=Nw.%20States%20in%20Action (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (last visited Sept. 5, 2011) (providing updates on state environmental
action).
207. “The Carbon Disclosure Project is an independent not-for-profit organization
holding the largest database of primary corporate climate change information in the
world.” Carbon Disclosure Project, supra note 205; see also Greenhouse Gas Protocol, R
About the GHG Protocol (2011), http://www.ghgprotocol.org/about-ghgp (on file with
the Columbia Law Review) (“The Greenhouse Gas Protocol is the most widely used
international accounting tool for government and business leaders to understand,
quantify, and manage greenhouse gas emissions.”).
208. See supra note 206 and accompanying text (describing state emissions disclosure R
requirements).
209. See Sutley Memorandum, supra note 155, at 1 (citing CEQ’s technical guidance R
under NEPA); Technical Support, supra note 152, at 1 (citing EPA’s technical guidance R
under its mandatory disclosure rule).
210. See Sutley Memorandum, supra note 155, at 1 (citing CEQ’s technical guidance R
under NEPA).
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The legislative emissions estimates could include direct and indirect
emissions to reduce incentives for leakage,211 but a rule of reason could
be followed to ensure that the time and transaction costs of calculating
carbon emissions do not become prohibitive. Further, to avoid making
the calculations overly burdensome, reasonable constraints could be
placed on the extent of the indirect emissions (e.g., including only first-
and second-tier suppliers) and time period (e.g., the ten-year time hori-
zon used for budgeting purposes) subject to analysis.212 Fiscal budgeting
involves similar uncertainty. The Congressional Budget Office routinely
creates estimates of projected effects of legislation and budget proposals
based on different models of macroeconomic changes likely in the next
ten years, and routinely makes assumptions about how other legislation,
including changes in tax policy, might affect their estimates.213 Carbon
emission estimates and budget estimates both involve similar types of
judgments and assumptions based on uncertainty about future events.
At a fundamental level, the carbon disclosure proposal builds on the
core insight that if a set of interests is not being sufficiently protected by
federal legislation, it is worth adopting new legislative procedures to help
those interests.214 That approach has been taken with federalism inter-
ests,215 and with deficit reduction goals.216 A requirement that the car-
bon impact of legislation be disclosed would fall in the same class. At the
same time, it also directly addresses the most important gap in our cur-
rent carbon disclosure regime. As noted above, current law requires dis-
211. For a discussion of the importance of leakage (the shifting of emissions from a
jurisdiction where emissions are regulated to one where they are not), indirect emissions,
and methods of reducing the costs of calculating indirect emissions, see Michael P.
Vandenbergh, Climate Change: The China Problem, 81 S. Cal. L. Rev. 905, 945–50 (2008);
Vandenbergh & Cohen, supra note 201, at 282. R
212. Alternatively, the disclosure could apply only to legislation that involves more
than a threshold level (e.g., 10,000 or 25,000 metric tons) of carbon per year. The 25,000-
ton threshold, as discussed above, was adopted in the EPA’s mandatory disclosure rule and
the executive order requiring GHG targeting by agencies. See supra text accompanying
note 157. R
213. For an example of the assumptions the CBO must make in creating protections,
see, for example, Cong. Budget Office, An Analysis of the President’s Budgetary Proposals
for Fiscal Year 2011 app. B (2010), http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/112xx/doc11280/front
matter.shtml (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (using “‘textbook’ growth model,”
“life-cycle growth model,” and “infinite-horizon growth model” to analyze supply-side
effects of budget); id. app. A (relying on assumptions about tax policy in ten-year period of
budget estimate).
214. See Garrett, Enhancing, supra note 193, at 1115 (“[I]f one believes that R
federalism interests are insufficiently protected, one should consider directing some efforts
toward the adoption of new legislative procedures.”).
215. See supra text accompanying notes 179–195 (discussing Unfunded Mandates R
Reform Act of 1995).
216. See supra text accompanying notes 175–178 (discussing 1974 Budget Act). R
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closure for federal agencies and much of private industry, but not for
federal legislation. Congress is the outlier.217
IV. PAY-AS-YOU-GO EMISSIONS BUDGETING
The literature on emissions disclosure by governments and private
firms suggests that disclosure alone often has a surprisingly strong influ-
ence on decisionmaking.218 But given that carbon emissions are deeply
intertwined with economic activity, it would be naive to assume that dis-
closure alone would prompt Congress to achieve substantial overall re-
ductions in carbon emissions in the near term without an enforcement
mechanism. Instead, after an initial disclosure-alone period to fine-tune
the carbon emissions estimation process for legislation, Congress should
subject all federal legislation to emissions budgeting, similar to the
Pay-As-You-Go (PAYGO) budget regime adopted in the 1990s to reduce
the deficit.219 As with the disclosure regime we sketch, an emissions
PAYGO approach could be adopted not just by Congress but also by states
and municipalities.220 Under this regime, the net effects of legislation ap-
217. This regime could also be adopted by state and local legislative bodies, and
transnational legislative powers, such as the European Union. It is also worth highlighting
the active congressional interest in legislative disclosure requirements. In a 2001 article,
Elizabeth Garrett and Adrian Vermeule proposed adoption of “constitutional impact
statements,” which, similar to the proposal we make here for carbon disclosure, would
require committees to include a statement of the bill’s constitutional implications before it
could be debated on the floor. Garrett & Vermeule, supra note 23, at 1310. On January 5, R
2011, the House revised its own rules to require such a statement of the Congress’s
constitutional power to enact the proposed legislation. See House Rules, supra note 169, R
Rule XII, cl. 7(c)(1) (adopted Jan. 5, 2011). The House revision does not require as
detailed a statement as Professors Garrett and Vermeule proposed, but it clearly seeks to
prompt more deliberation about Congress’s constitutional powers. See id. In its
justification for this Rule, the House Rules Committee writes, “Just as a cost estimate from
the Congressional Budget Office informs the debate on a proposed bill, a statement
outlining the power under the Constitution that Congress has to enact a proposed bill will
inform and provide the basis for debate.” Comm. on Rules, U.S. House of Representatives,
New Constitutional Authority Requirement for Introduced Legislation (Jan. 5, 2011),
http://rules.house.gov/about/PolicyDetail.aspx?NewsID=72 (on file with the Columbia
Law Review). So too with regard to carbon emissions.
218. See Shameek Konar & Mark A. Cohen, Information as Regulation: The Effect of
Community Right to Know Laws on Toxic Emission, 32 J. Envtl. Econ. & Mgmt. 109, 123
(1997) (finding relationship between toxic release reporting and later toxic emissions).
219. Budget Enforcement Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, tit. XIII, §§ 13201–13204,
104 Stat. 1388, 1388-609 to 1388-616 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2
U.S.C.). Federal agencies, as noted above, have already committed to reducing emissions
by 28% in ten years. See supra text accompanying note 150. R
220. In particular, the PAYGO approach may provide the carbon discipline necessary
for many cities to achieve the commitments made in the Mayors Climate Protection
Agreement, which has been signed by more than 1,000 mayors and which requires
essentially that government operations achieve the carbon emissions targets included for
the United States in the Kyoto Protocol. U.S. Conference of Mayors, U.S. Mayors Climate
Protection Agreement (2005), avaliable at http://www.usmayors.org/climateprotection/
documents/mcpagreement.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
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proved in any congressional term must fall within an established emis-
sions budget, just as under budgetary versions of PAYGO the net effect of
federal spending has to fall within particular deficit reduction goals. The
PAYGO approach can be used with a simple no-net-increase rule or can
follow a particular carbon emissions reduction glide path.
The turn to PAYGO rules is admittedly a second-best solution. It con-
cedes that fine-tuning the optimum annual national emissions budgets
and specific target reductions has been stalled politically; to date, our
ordinary political process has not led to significant emissions reductions,
and it shows little signs of doing so. In light of this impasse, a first prag-
matic step is to require that, to the extent a new statute, appropriation, or
major agency action increases carbon emissions, equal or greater emis-
sions reductions would need to be found elsewhere from within the wing-
span of Congress or the relevant agency.
PAYGO emissions budgeting directly confronts the analytic slippage
and cognitive effects that create the one percent problem. The one per-
cent problem emerges from treating each case individually, irrespective
of the cumulative effects on the whole, and of treating small contribu-
tions as if they did not exist. In contrast, this budgeting approach re-
quires individual decisions to be made with reference to cumulative
targets. Under PAYGO budgeting, it does not matter whether a source
affected by legislation is one percent or less; what matters is that the net
effect of the legislation produce equal or lesser carbon emissions.
A. Our Two Deficits: Budget and Emissions
The government’s fiscal deficit and the emissions problem have strik-
ing parallels. To begin with, in both areas we are running a severe deficit.
The government’s fiscal deficit has ballooned in the last ten years.221 The
country is also emitting far more GHGs on an annual basis than climate
models allow. As we addressed in Part II, climate scientists have estab-
lished targets for emissions reductions needed to keep atmospheric car-
bon concentrations below 450 to 500 ppm of CO2, and thus to decrease
the risk of catastrophic climate change.222 Although the exact level and
slope of the descending glide path of net emissions is still subject to some
debate, it is clear that the country’s current net emissions far exceed
those targets. With a small exception arising from the recession, the trend
of U.S. emissions is ascending.223 In short, we are in the red: Our national
emissions far exceed our target budgets, just as our current federal
spending far exceeds federal revenues.
221. See Cong. Budget Office, Federal Debt and Interest Costs 11 (Dec. 2010),
available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/119xx/doc11999/12-14-FederalDebt.pdf (on file
with the Columbia Law Review) (showing change from federal budget surplus of $236
billion in 2000 to federal budget deficit of $1,294 billion in 2010).
222. See supra text accompanying notes 84–85. R
223. Matthew L. Wald, Recession Special: Cleaner Air, N.Y. Times, Jan. 16, 2011, at
WK2.
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With regard to political dynamics, the emissions problem is surpris-
ingly analogous to the deficit problem. The political costs of deficit re-
duction are near-term, specific to identifiable interest groups, and easy to
quantify, but the benefits (lower bond rates, etc.) are long-term, diffuse,
and difficult to quantify. So too with emissions reductions: The costs of
reductions are near-term, easy to quantify, and target identifiable groups;
the benefits are long-term, hard to quantify, and have diffuse impacts.
Finally, like the climate change problem, the government’s fiscal def-
icit is an instance of a one percent problem. Government spending fol-
lows from so many decisions by so many actors that it is frequently indi-
vidually rational for those actors to continue to spend, or seek more
funding, without attention to the cumulative effects of those decisions.
The arguments for seeking more spending in those cases are one percent
arguments: They rely on assessing individual contributions or expendi-
tures one by one in relation to some whole or denominator (“my contri-
butions are just one percent of the problem or budget”),224 and do so
without considering the cumulative effects of those individual decisions.
This allows individual spending decisions to creep upward, each decision
rationalized on its own terms, without attention to their cumulative ef-
fects. Once those individual decisions lead to the undesired aggregate
outcome, they create a budget one percent problem to stand alongside
the emissions one percent problem.
B. Fiscal Versus Carbon Deficit Accounting
One very stark difference between the government’s fiscal deficit
and the carbon deficit concerns accounting and budgeting measures.
With the fiscal deficit, the government monitors and records the magni-
tude of the deficit. A principal statutory duty of the Congressional Budget
Office is to prepare budget projections and cost estimates of legisla-
tion.225 The CBO publishes multiple reports a year on the state of the
federal deficit,226 and the federal deficit is a major issue for political con-
sideration and evaluation in Congress.
224. See, e.g., 155 Cong. Rec. S10,257, S10,269 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 2009) (statement of
Sen. Bill Nelson) (defending NASA spending as “less than 1 percent of the total Federal
budget”); 150 Cong. Rec. H4175, H4217 (daily ed. June 16, 2004) (statement of Rep.
Louise Slaughter) (advocating for increase in spending for federal arts agencies as “1/100
of 1 percent of the Federal budget”); 140 Cong. Rec. H3967, H4036 (daily ed. May 25,
1994) (statement of Rep. Nita Lowey) (advocating for foreign aid bill as “such a small
percentage of Federal spending—less than 1 percent of the budget”).
225. See 2 U.S.C. § 653(1) (2006).
226. See, e.g., Cong. Budget Office, Budget and Economic Information, http://
www.cbo.gov/budget/budget.cfm (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (last visited Aug.
27, 2011) (stating that “Monthly Budget Reviews . . . help to inform the Congress and the
public on the monthly status of outlays, receipts, and the deficit or surplus throughout the
fiscal year”).
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As we have seen, the same is not true regarding carbon emissions.227
The closest the federal government comes to tracking and targeting car-
bon emissions is the process created by the 2009 executive order dis-
cussed above.228 The executive order provides a useful starting point for
discussing carbon budgeting. As we noted above, the executive order re-
quires agencies to create agency-wide targets to reduce emissions by 2020
relative to a 2008 baseline.229 Based on emissions targets generated by
each agency, President Obama announced that the federal government
would reduce its direct emissions by 28% from the 2008 baseline by
2020,230 reduce its indirect emissions by 13% by 2020,231 and provide an
annual monitoring mechanism.232
The executive order represents a significant advance in several re-
spects. First, and most important, the agency-wide focus frames agency
actions in terms of the agency’s net emissions; if the agency increases
emissions for some activities, it must assess whether emissions reductions
can be achieved elsewhere. Second, the executive order requires agencies
to set targets for agency-wide emissions reductions, and enforces these
targets with compliance and monitoring obligations. This is an elemen-
tary form of budgeting. Third, the executive order requires comparisons
relative to a baseline, facilitating year-over-year or relative
comparisons.233
Of course, the executive order does not extend to Congress.
Congress has no baseline of yearly emissions within which it must keep its
legislative activity. Given both that carbon emissions can be readily esti-
mated and that the course of the nation’s emissions needs to be reversed,
it makes sense to understand our national carbon emissions as an analog
to deficit expenditures—that is, to see it as a consideration, like spending
and revenue, relevant to virtually every government action.
C. What Budgeting Rule for Carbon?
Developing an emissions budgeting scheme for carbon emissions is
an ambitious task; we aim here only to sketch some of the basic building
blocks for a legislative budgeting scheme. Given that the federal govern-
227. See supra text accompanying notes 188–190 (discussing disclosure of financial
costs of legislation).
228. Federal Leadership in Environmental, Energy, and Economic Performance,
Exec. Order No. 13,514, 3 C.F.R 248 (2010).
229. Id. § 2(a)–(b), 3 C.F.R. at 249–50 (2010).
230. Press Release, White House Press Office, President Obama Sets Greenhouse Gas
Emissions Reduction Target for Federal Operations, supra note 150. R
231. Press Release, White House Press Office, President Obama Expands Greenhouse
Gas Reduction Target for Federal Operations, supra note 150. R
232. See supra text accompanying notes 151–152 (discussing agencies’ emissions R
reduction reporting requirements).
233. See J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Gaming the Past: The Theory and Practice of
Historic Baselines in the Administrative State, 64 Vand. L. Rev. 1, 18–44 (2011) (showing
benefits and possible manipulation of historical baselines as regulatory metric).
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ment does not evaluate legislation’s impact on emissions, subjecting legis-
lation to some budgeting, regardless of the particular budgeting rule,
would be a tremendous advance in addressing the one percent problem
for carbon emissions. Budgeting changes the frame of reference from
individual expenditures to the cumulative impact of many small (and
large) decisions. That change of reference exposes what one percent ar-
guments seek to obscure: the net impact of decisions expressed in a sin-
gle metric. Carbon emissions budgeting would force decisions to be made
in reference to net effects, as opposed to allowing the frame of reference
to be defined so that cumulative effects fall outside the framework of
decision.
In view of the benefits of budgeting, the question is what budgeting
rule fits the emissions problem. In the next sections, we argue that the
severity of the emissions deficit, and the political tradeoffs required to
solve it, recommend a budgeting precommitment strategy of last resort, a
PAYGO rule, and address how a PAYGO rule fits alongside other carbon
emissions reduction policies.
1. Fiscal PAYGO Budgeting. — The basic idea of PAYGO budgeting is
straightforward: It requires that additional spending (or reductions in
revenue) that exceed a target budget be “paid for” either by offsetting
decreases in spending or increases in revenue.234 In other words, a
PAYGO rule requires the legislative actions to which it applies be cost-
neutral, in the sense that they do not increase the budget deficit (or re-
duce a surplus) over a specified target.235
PAYGO budget rules rose to prominence in the late 1980s and early
1990s as a second-best approach to fiscal budgeting after successive
Congresses and presidential administrations had proven unable
to stick to a target budget. In 1985, Congress enacted the Balanced
Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (known as
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings),236 which established target budget deficits
and a process for sequestration of funds for overages.237 The Congress
and the President, however, failed to meet the target deficit reductions
set in the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act, and in 1990, established a
PAYGO budgeting process applicable to discretionary spending.238 After
234. Cong. Budget Office, CBO Staff Memorandum: Pay-As-You-Go Budgeting 1
(1990), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/77xx/doc7750/90-CBO-019.pdf (on file
with the Columbia Law Review).
235. Perspectives on Renewing Statutory PAYGO: Hearings Before H. Comm. on the
Budget, 110th Cong. 13 (2007) [hereinafter PAYGO Hearing] (statement of Peter Orszag,
Director, Congressional Budget Office).
236. Pub. L. No. 99-177, 99 Stat. 1038 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2
U.S.C.).
237. See id. § 201, 99 Stat. at 1039 (providing five-year reductions of maximum
deficits); id. §§ 251–253, 99 Stat. at 1063–78 (providing process for sequestration in view of
overages).
238. Budget Enforcement Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-508, §§ 13201–13204, 104 Stat.
1388, 1388 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C.); Robert Keith, Cong.
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reinstatement in 1993 and 1997, Congress allowed the statutory PAYGO
requirements to lapse in 2002.239 From 2002 to 2010, PAYGO rules had a
bumpy ride of lapse and reenactment,240 serving for a period only as in-
ternal rules of the House and Senate until the reinstatement of statutory
PAYGO budgeting on a permanent basis in 2010 in the Statutory Pay-As-
You-Go Act of 2010.241 Like its predecessors, the 2010 Act aims “to en-
force a rule of budget neutrality on new revenue and direct spending
legislation.”242
The 2010 Act provides a good overview of how a statutory PAYGO
requirement works. The first key feature of the 2010 Act is the require-
ment that the House or Senate include an estimate of the budgetary ef-
fects of each piece of proposed legislation prior to voting on it.243 These
estimates are provided by the chairs of each House’s respective budget
committee, based on estimates (in the form of five- and ten-year score-
cards) created by the Congressional Budget Office.244 After each session
of Congress ends, OMB determines whether either the House or Senate
scorecard records a debit for the budget year.245 If so, the President “shall
issue” a sequestration order that reduces spending by enough to offset
the debit (or the larger of the two debits, if both the House and Senate
PAYGO scorecards have debits),246 with certain exceptions.247
The Senate’s own PAYGO rule has a similar substantive aim, but it
deploys a different enforcement mechanism. The Senate rule prohibits
Senate consideration of any mandatory spending or revenue legislation
that would increase the budget deficit.248 If legislation that violates the
PAYGO principle is introduced, it is subject to a point of order, which
requires a vote of sixty Senators to waive.249 In general, points of order
have been successful when raised.250 Between 1993 and 2009, forty-three
points of order were raised; in all cases except one, they prompted a mo-
Research Serv., R41157, The Statutory Pay-As-You-Go Act of 2010: Summary and Legislative
History 1 (2010).
239. For more detailed accounts of the statutory path of the PAYGO statutes, see
Keith, supra note 238, at 2–3; George K. Yin, Temporary-Effect Legislation, Political R
Accountability, and Fiscal Restraint, 84 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 174, 226 n.208 (2009).
240. See Keith, supra note 238, at 2–3; Yin, supra note 239, at 226 n.208 (providing R
capsule summary of fate of PAYGO provisions during period).
241. Pub. L. No. 111-139, 124 Stat. 8 (to be codified in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C.).
242. Id. § 2, 124 Stat. at 8.
243. Id. § 4(a)(2)(A), 124 Stat. at 10–11.
244. Id. § 4(b), 124 Stat. at 11–12; Keith, supra note 238, at 8–9. R
245. Statutory Pay-As-You-Go Act of 2010 § 5(a)–(b), 124 Stat. at 15–16.
246. Id. (providing that OMB shall prepare and President “shall issue”).
247. Id. §§ 5(b), 6(a)(1), 124 Stat. at 15–16 (subjecting only direct spending to
sequestration).
248. S. Con. Res. 21, 110th Cong. § 201(a) (2007) (enacted).
249. Id. § 201(b).
250. Bill Heniff, Jr., Cong. Research Serv., RL 31943, Budget Enforcement
Procedures: Senate Pay-As-You-Go (PAYGO) Rule 11 (2010).
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tion to waive the point of order.251 During that time, the Senate voted to
waive consideration of the PAYGO point of order only eight times; in all
the other instances, the point of order was sustained, preventing consid-
eration of the issue.252
PAYGO budgeting rules have not been a budgeting panacea, but
they have fundamentally altered the budget debate. “Offset requirements
force those seeking [new] federal benefits to undertake an additional
role,” Elizabeth Garrett writes of PAYGO budgeting. “[N]ot only are they
funding seekers, but they must also become funding predators.”253
Under PAYGO rules, to propose additional expenditures or programs,
groups must first “advocate eliminating or reducing an existing one.”254
In this way, PAYGO rules increase the cost of proposing new spending or
revenue reductions because the proposal must demonstrate how the ad-
ditional cost or lost revenue would be offset. More generally, the rules
require that each expenditure be justified in relation to all other expedi-
tures. Most analysts conclude that PAYGO rules do affect legislative
outcomes.255
This is not to say that PAYGO rules are without limitations or imper-
vious to manipulation. To begin with, PAYGO rules address only the cost
of new legislation, not the cost of legislation that is already on the
books.256 PAYGO has typically applied only to subsets of federal spending
and revenue decisions, leaving important carve-outs for spending and rev-
enue policy outside of its scope.257 PAYGO rules are also silent as to the
budget effects that occur outside the budget window (ten years in the
2010 Act).258 PAYGO rules are also susceptible to political winds, and
have been suspended for legislation viewed as “must-pass,” such as the
2008 economic stimulus legislation or the legislation to maintain the al-
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Garrett, Harnessing, supra note 25, at 515. R
254. Id.
255. See, e.g., PAYGO Hearing, supra note 235, at 6 (statement of Peter Orszag, R
Director, Congressional Budget Office) (stating PAYGO rules “can definitely help to
enforce fiscal discipline . . . .”); Allen Schick, The Federal Budget: Politics, Policy, Process
170–71 (3d ed. 2007) (noting that under PAYGO “all revenue losses had to be offset” and
that PAYGO rules “forced both House and Senate to play the offsets game . . . to include
revenue-raising provisions whose sole purpose is to make room for tax cuts”).
256. See Yin, supra note 239, at 227 (deeming PAYGO a “modest step toward budget R
restraint”).
257. See Statutory Pay-As-You-Go Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-139, § 11, 124 Stat. 8,
24–29 (to be codified at 2 U.S.C. § 905) (exempting some programs and tax policy); see
also Keith, supra note 238, at 9 (providing account of gaps in PAYGO coverage). R
258. See Yin, supra note 239, at 228 (noting that because PAYGO is silent about R
budget effects outside of ten-year window it is subject to manipulation by Congress). If
Congress only passed permanent spending increases and temporary spending cuts (or tax
increases), it could do an end-run around PAYGO limitations. Id. For a helpful treatment
of the accounting and timing tricks Congress has used to evade PAYGO rules, see generally
Cheryl D. Block, Pathologies at the Intersection of the Budget and Tax Legislative
Processes, 43 B.C. L. Rev. 863 (2002).
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ternative minimum tax.259 Perhaps more fundamentally, an effective
PAYGO requires accurate estimates of financial consequences of legisla-
tion. Without reasonably accurate estimates, the offsets that PAYGO re-
quires do not do their work. But even with these limitations, PAYGO rules
have altered the dynamics and outcomes of budgeting.
2. Carbon PAYGO Budgeting. — An emissions PAYGO rule could op-
erate very similarly to the basic structure of budgeting PAYGO rules. Each
proposed and enacted bill would be required to include a statement of its
net impact on carbon emissions over a five- or ten-year period. The
Congressional Budget Office carbon emissions estimates, the disclosure
requirement defended above, would be the basis for these emissions
statements, just as the CBO budget estimates form the basis of fiscal
PAYGO disclosures.260 Likewise, at the end of the congressional session,
OMB could be tasked with finalizing the emissions scorecard of the ses-
sion’s legislation; in the event of overages, the President could be author-
ized to withhold or sequester funds for the projects that create carbon
emissions deficits (with emergency exceptions, just as those used for
PAYGO rules).261 Alternatively, the carbon PAYGO scheme could take
the form of a House or Senate rule, enforced by a point of order for bills
that are not carbon neutral.
In the form of either a statute or House or Senate Rule, an emissions
PAYGO regime would put immediate pressure on proponents of any leg-
islative activity to identify offsets—whether in the form of reduced emis-
sions through greater efficiencies and conservation, or in the form of se-
questration projects—to make the legislation’s emissions effects net
neutral. The political calculus attached to virtually all legislation would
shift; it would induce those proposing emissions-increasing legislation to
become carbon predators as well, looking for offsetting emissions reduc-
tions, just as budgetary PAYGO forces a search for offsets.
Consider, for instance, a congressional requirement for greater fuel
efficiency in cars or trucks. To a member of Congress who seeks to fund a
project, like the construction of a highway, which would create emissions
both directly through construction-related activities and indirectly
through increased motor vehicle use, the fuel efficiency standards now
have a new value: They can help offset the emissions effect of a particular
road-building project. An emissions PAYGO rule would attach a value to
offsetting emissions reductions (or sequestration) in the political process
that currently does not exist.
A PAYGO carbon budgeting rule directly addresses the one percent
problem. Budget estimates for legislation put the costs of legislation on
259. See Yin, supra note 239, at 229. R
260. Compare Statutory Pay-As-You-Go Act of 2010, § 4(b), 124 Stat. at 11–12 (to be
codified at 2 U.S.C. § 933) (providing for CBO estimates), with id. § 4(c), 124 Stat. at
12–13 (to be codified at 2 U.S.C. § 933) (providing for OMB adjustments).
261. See id. § 4(g), 124 Stat. at 14–15 (to be codified at 2 U.S.C. § 933) (providing for
emergency legislation subject to point of order in Senate).
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the table for consideration along with the legislation; a PAYGO rule
forces an accounting of the total effects of any new proposals. The fact
that any individual’s contribution is likely to be relatively small does not
matter because those contributions are aggregated and made relevant by
the demand for a net neutral emissions result.
3. Limitations and Objections. — It is important to understand how a
carbon PAYGO scheme would fit alongside other climate change policies.
We focus here on the relationship between carbon PAYGO and the lead-
ing measures in the policy debate to date: a carbon tax and a cap and
trade system.
a. How Does Carbon PAYGO Fit with Carbon Tax and Cap and Trade? —
Perhaps the most important question is how a carbon PAYGO scheme
could complement other approaches to climate change, such as cap and
trade and a carbon tax, that have received considerable attention. The
answer has two parts.
Second-Best. — The first is that a carbon PAYGO regime is a second-
best solution in ways that cap and trade and a carbon tax are not. In the
near term, economic schemes like cap and trade or a carbon tax are
more likely to efficiently locate sources for emissions reduction. In the
robust climate change debate over the past two decades, however, neither
of these more efficient solutions to emissions reductions has been
adopted, and they may not be adopted in time to achieve the necessary
near-term emissions reductions.262 A carbon PAYGO regime is better tai-
lored to address the friction points in the legislative process, and it can
provide a step toward these other measures. Like taxes, industry- or
sector-based carbon caps are difficult to establish and maintain because
they impose costs on known parties. An across-the-board PAYGO regime,
in contrast, allows Congress to clearly establish (and claim) a commit-
ment to a simple and broadly appealing idea, without disclosing at the
outset how it will affect particular constituencies. Because of its across-the-
board focus, it also shifts the dynamics of negotiations; it makes clear that
all aspects of the economy, not merely those targeted by a tax or cap and
trade regime, are a possible source of reductions.
If a carbon PAYGO system is implemented as a first step, it could not
only help to generate momentum for other policies, such as cap and
trade and carbon taxation, but also play a useful role if those measures
were implemented. Once a sense of urgency and priority about climate
change becomes sufficient to support cap and trade or carbon taxes,
those measures may be capable of producing a carbon surplus. But they
would also inevitably be subject to intense lobbying from one percent
sources (for example, asking for “carbon tax relief”). The carbon PAYGO
system, however, is designed to prevent those arguments from prevailing,
262. See Ruhl & Salzman, Climate Change, supra note 25, at 59 (discussing mitigation R
options); William B. Bonvillian, Time for Climate Plan B, Issues in Sci. & Tech., Winter
2011, at 51, 51 (noting that carbon mitigation measures should be implemented promptly
because “the nation cannot afford to suspend climate efforts”).
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in part by putting carbon and money on a similar footing. As in the fiscal
context, PAYGO in the carbon emissions context provides transparency
about the impacts of legislative activity, does so with a common metric,
and creates hurdles to the kinds of near-term, interest-group-serving be-
havior that now dominates policymaking.
Government Decisions. — Even if a carbon tax and a cap and trade
scheme are adopted, a carbon PAYGO rule addresses government deci-
sions that these measures do not. A cap and trade scheme and a carbon
tax can and should create strong economic incentives to reduce carbon
emissions. In simple terms, by increasing the cost of generating emis-
sions, these schemes would generate investment in more emissions-
efficient technologies, thus creating incentives to conserve.
Neither a cap and trade scheme nor a carbon tax, however, creates
direct incentives for government to take carbon emissions into account.
Moreover, there is a limit to how far economic incentives, without infra-
structure change, can reduce emissions. Consider automobiles. Cap and
trade, carbon tax, and even high requirements for tailpipe emissions
could radically reduce emissions by reshaping the nation’s fleet of auto-
mobiles, but they will not build mass transportation alternatives. They
may increase the public support for these alternatives, but many of the
political economy problems that have barred investments in mass trans-
port in the past will still exist. The carbon PAYGO requirement, on the
other hand, would force legislators to confront these choices before pub-
lic opinion shifts. By disclosing the carbon implications of a wide range of
federal decisions, it may hasten the shift in public opinion. The carbon
PAYGO disclosure, and the debates that the disclosure will generate
about how carbon emissions should be accounted for in the legislative
process, can be expected to generate news accounts in the mass media. In
sum, carbon PAYGO provides an accounting mechanism for large-scale
infrastructure choices that have tremendous long-term impacts on car-
bon emissions.
b. Too Radical or Too Minimal? — A carbon PAYGO regime might
appear impossibly ambitious or too cautious. On the one hand, in the
current political environment, the requirement that legislation be carbon
neutral would itself require a significant change in legislative priorities.
On the other hand, based on current climate science models, a carbon
PAYGO scheme looks underambitious because it would address only new
legislation, just as the budgetary PAYGO scheme applies only to new legis-
lation and budgets, and would not require reassessment of the carbon or
budget costs of already enacted legislation. In a sense both of these objec-
tions are right; it is both too ambitious and too cautious. But in view of
the stagnation of other proposed large-scale measures, and the way in
which a PAYGO scheme confronts carbon’s one percent problem, a car-
bon PAYGO scheme deserves legislative and policymaking attention. It
not only fills a gap in our current policy—Congress is an outlier in not
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budgeting the carbon emissions of its action—but also directly confronts
the slippage that one percent arguments exploit.
Of course, it would be preferable if the exact shape of the emissions
glide path required in a PAYGO regime could be established through
scientific and policy analysis. Perhaps when that becomes possible, and
when the public shares the sense of urgency and priority that is felt by
climate scientists, legislative carbon predators may be required to find
more than one ton of carbon emissions avoided for every ton increased
(much like the offset ratchet required of new sources in areas that are not
in attainment with the Clean Air Act national ambient air quality stan-
dards). But one of the benefits of the PAYGO proposal is that a “no net
increase” approach may impose a certain amount of political discipline
and achieve some carbon reductions even if the glide path analysis be-
comes bogged down in partisan rancor. The wide appeal of the “no net
loss” policy for wetlands is a good example of the traction that this simple
concept can have in policy debates. There is no inherent reason why the
current amount of wetlands is optimal—we could have more or less than
desired—but this simple, static metric has been influential for almost
twenty years.263
c. Scalable Solutions Amenable to Private Initiative. — The legislative car-
bon disclosure and carbon PAYGO approaches we propose for the U.S.
Congress could be scaled up to international bodies, or adopted domesti-
cally with regard to smaller entities than Congress.
They can be scaled up for use by entities at the international level
ranging from the European Union to the United Nations to the World
Bank. They also can be scaled down to require disclosure and budgeting
for federal regulations. Specifically, the carbon analysis could be included
in the OIRA’s review of regulations,264 through a revision to the regula-
tory review executive order.265 These disclosure and PAYGO require-
ments could also be scaled down for adoption by state legislatures, local
county commissions, and city councils.266 The general concept of refram-
ing emissions sources from individual contributions to net effects also
may be valuable to nongovernmental organizations when they develop
carbon advocacy campaigns and firms when they develop corporate car-
bon strategies. In addition, even before the will exists in Congress or
other governmental bodies to adopt a carbon disclosure and PAYGO ap-
263. See Michael P. Vandenbergh, An Alternative to Ready, Fire, Aim: A New
Framework to Link Environmental Targets in Environmental Law, 85 Ky. L.J. 803, 893–94
(1997) (discussing “no net loss” policy and other metrics).
264. Exec. Order No. 12,866, §§  1, 6(a)(2), 3 C.F.R. 638, 638, 645 (1994) (stating as
principle of regulation that benefits must justify costs, and requiring specific calculation of
costs and benefits for significant regulations), amended by Exec. Order No. 13,563, § 1, 76
Fed. Reg. 3821, 3821 (Jan. 18, 2011).
265. Id.
266. For a recent review of other state and local climate mitigation options, see
generally Katherine A. Trisolini, All Hands on Deck: Local Governments and the Potential
for Bidirectional Climate Change Regulation, 62 Stan. L. Rev. 669 (2010).
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proach, nongovernmental organizations could begin calculating and dis-
closing a carbon scorecard of legislative activity. Those nongovernmental
calculations could put this information into the public debate about legis-
lation, increasing pressure on legislators to hold themselves accountable.
CONCLUSION
Climate change creates a perfect setting for one percent arguments;
the global nature of the problem invites framing contributions to it in
global terms. But if we carry our intuitive acceptance of one percent argu-
ments for exemption from regulation to this global stage, the prospect
for a solution moves further from reach. The reasons are clear: It is nearly
impossible to reach established emissions reduction goals without ad-
dressing the vast number of sources, sectors, and countries that can frame
their emissions as just one percent, or far below one percent, of the prob-
lem. But the frequency and force of one percent arguments in every do-
main of climate change policy—not to mention the near-complete im-
passe on progress on emissions reductions—suggests that one percent
arguments retain a potent currency.
Our response aims to reframe the issue away from individual excep-
tions, accreting individually, toward an aggregate assessment of emissions
goals. To do so, we suggest at a minimum plugging a neglected but gap-
ing hole: the lack of a requirement that Congress even measure the emis-
sions effects of legislation, unlike federal agencies and a vast swath of
private industry. Disclosure is a powerful tool for politics; and carbon
emissions disclosure, like disclosure of the financial costs of legislation,
will at least inform the backdrop of legislative debates. But disclosure
alone is not as effective as setting enforceable limits. We therefore also
propose Pay-As-You-Go carbon budgeting as a pragmatic first step in the
nation’s emissions reduction strategy. Climate science makes clear that in
the near term global and national emissions must begin to decline; re-
quiring that future legislation be at least net carbon neutral is a modest
first step in that direction. It is also a step that directly confronts one
percent arguments because it forces all emissions to be evaluated in rela-
tion to their net effects. A focus on net effects will deter, if not defeat, one
percent arguments.
